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ABSTRACT
Physical Layer Authentication for Wireless Communications
by
Pinchang Zhang
Authentication serves as a critical property of secure communication to verify the
identity of the entity involved in the communication. With the rapid development
of wireless technologies, the flexible and cost-effective authentication is becoming an
increasingly urgent demand for future wireless networks. This is because on one hand,
the open and broadcast natures of wireless communications make wireless networks
more vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where an unauthorized transmitter may imper-
sonate as a legitimate one. On the other hand, with the wide deployment of Internet
of things (IoT) and continuous evolvement of wireless technologies toward the fifth
generation (5G) and beyond networks, it is foreseeable that future wireless networks
will be consisted of a large number of heterogeneous devices, making cryptographic
authentication techniques in wireless networks a challenging issue. Recently, phys-
ical layer authentication techniques, which exploit intrinsic and unique features of
physical layer for authentication, has drawn a considerable attention to enhance and
complement conventional cryptography-based authentication solutions. This thesis
focuses on the study of physical layer authentication for wireless communications.
We first explore the channel-based authentication solution taking hardware im-
pairments into account and thus propose a new channel-based authentication scheme
for massive multiple input-multiple-output (MIMO) systems with non-ideal hard-
ware. In particular, based on signal processing theory, we formulate channel estima-
tion under hardware impairments and determine error covariance matrix to assess the
quantity caused by hardware impairments on authentication performance. With the
help of hypothesis testing and matrix transformation theories, we are able to derive
exact expressions for the probabilities of false alarm and detection under different
channel covariance matrix models. Extensive simulations are carried out to validate
theoretical results and illustrate the efficiency of the proposed scheme. Impacts of
system parameters on performance are revealed as well.
We then propose a novel authentication solution which not only exploits location-
specific wireless channels but also utilizes transmitter-specific hardware impairments
for authentication, and thus propose an improved channel-based scheme jointly utiliz-
ing channel gain and phase noise in heterogeneous MIMO systems. Three properties
of the proposed scheme: covertness, robustness, and security, are analyzed in de-
tail. By using a maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) and extended Kalman filter
(EKF), we estimate channel gains and phase noise, and formulate variances of esti-
mation errors. We also quantize the temporal variations of channel gains and phase
noise through the developed quantizers. Based on theories of hypothesis testing and
stochastic process, we then derive the closed-form expressions for false alarm and
missed detection probabilities with the consideration of quantization errors. Simula-
tions are carried out to validate theoretical results of the two probabilities. Based on
theoretical models, we further demonstrate that the proposed scheme makes it pos-
sible for us to flexibly control performance by adjusting parameters (such as channel
gain threshold, phase noise threshold, and decision threshold) to achieve a required
authentication performance in specific MIMO applications.
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Finally, we focus on the study of physical layer authentication in a dual-hop
wireless network with an untrusted relay and propose an end-to-end (E2E) channel-
based authentication scheme. This scheme fully utilizes wireless channel feature (i.e.,
channel impulse response in the dimensions of amplitude and path delay), and adopts
artificial jamming technique, so that it is not only resistant to impersonate attack from
an unauthorized transmitter but also resilient to replay attack from the untrusted
relay. Theoretical analysis is conducted to derive expressions for false alarm and
missed detection probabilities. Finally, numerical and simulation results are provided
to illustrate both the efficiency of these theoretical results and the E2E performance
of dual-hop wireless networks.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In this chapter, we first introduce the background of physical layer authentication
and then we present the objective and main work of this thesis. Finally, we give the
outline and main notations of this thesis.
1.1 Physical Layer Authentication
Authentication is a key security service verifying the claimed identity of a legit-
imate transmitter and rejecting an adversarial impersonation to secure communica-
tions [1]. Therefore, providing flexible and cost-effective non-cryptography authenti-
cation paradigms is becoming more and more important and challenging for emerging
networks (e.g., 5G and IoT networks). This is mainly due to the following two reasons.
The first one is that the broadcast nature of wireless medium makes communication
systems more vulnerable to various attacks such as impersonation and replay attacks
[2]. The other one is that mobile devices randomly join in or leave the network at
anytime, resulting in a challenging issue on the distribution and management of secret
keys for cryptographic methods for emerging networks [3].
Conventionally, authentication is implemented based on the cryptographic tech-
nique [4–6], where it is usually assumed that a secret key is shared in advance between
the transmitter and receiver. Nevertheless, the authentication relying on this assump-
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tion is increasingly being questioned in emerging network scenarios such as IoT, low
power wide area networks [7], and 5G wireless systems [8]. This is mainly due to the
reasons that distribution and management of secret keys become troublesome and
even impossible in such large-scale heterogeneous networks. Also, the distributed na-
ture of these scenarios makes the stored secret keys vulnerable to physical attacks.
E.g., an attacker may capture a legal device and break the keys via hardware level
attacks.
Recent works in authentication exploit intrinsic and unique features of physical
layer. This draws considerable attentions to both research and academic communi-
ties on the development of novel physical layer authentication schemes to comple-
ment conventional cryptography-based solutions. Such an authentication approach
allows a receiver to quickly differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate trans-
mitters, without having to complete higher-layer processing [9]. Therefore, physical
layer authentication is considered as a promising authentication solution for wire-
less communications, in which terminal devices might not be able to decode each
others’ higher-layer signaling, because they have different powers and computational
capabilities at different levels of the hierarchical architecture [10, 11].
Lots of research efforts have been devoted to the design of effective physical
layer authentication schemes, such as channel-based authentication and hardware
impairments-based authentication. The fundamental principle of channel-based au-
thentication is that wireless channels are spatially decorrelated between different
geographic locations, i.e., characteristics of channels between different transmitter-
receiver pairs are significantly different [12–14]. Hardware impairments-based au-
thentication identifies transmitters by using inherent transmitter-specific hardware
imperfections (e.g., phase noise, frequency error) [15, 16].
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1.2 Objectives and Main Contributions
This thesis exploits intrinsic and unique features of physical layer to authenticate
transmitters for wireless communications. Our objective is to design flexible and cost-
effective authentication schemes to ensure the security of wireless communications.
Towards this end, we first focus on authenticating transmitters in massive MIMO sys-
tems with non-ideal hardware, designing a new channel-based authentication scheme
with consideration of hardware impairments. We then develop a new authentication
scheme, which jointly utilizes two physical layer features (such as wireless channel
and hardware features). Finally, we examine the E2E physical layer authentication
in a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay and propose an E2E channel-
based scheme which utilizes wireless channel feature (i.e., channel impulse response
in the dimensions of gain and path delay). Three commonly-used authentication
performance metrics are of particular interest, which are false alarm (FA), missed
detection (MD), and successful detection (SD) probabilities. Here, FA occurs when
a frame transmitted by legitimate transmitter is mistakenly regarded as unauthentic;
while MD occurs when a frame originated from illegitimate transmitter is wrongly
judged as authentic; and SD occurs when a frame originated from illegitimate trans-
mitter is successfully judged as authentic. The main contributions of this thesis are
summarized in the following subsections.
1.2.1 Physical Layer Authentication for Massive MIMO Systems with
Hardware Impairments
It is demonstrated that the presence of hardware impairments not only limits
capacity but also deteriorates channel estimation accuracy in the high-power regime
[17, 18]. Therefore, channel estimation accuracy is affected by hardware impairments,
thermal noise, and multiuser interference. It is worth noting that for overall system
3
performance, considering aggregate effect of all impairments has more substantial
benefits than considering separately individual behavior of each hardware module.
Recently, increased attention has been focused on a novel system model with aggre-
gate residual hardware impairments which are characterized by independent additive
distortion noises at base station and user terminals [17, 19–21].
Hardware impairments need to be deliberately considered in the design of future
effective physical layer authentication schemes in massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) systems, which will serve as an essential technology in meeting the
continuously increasing throughput demands and spectrum efficiency for the fifth
generation (5G) and beyond networks. Based on this background, this work studies
transmitter authentication in massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) sys-
tems with non-ideal hardware for 5G and beyond networks. The main contributions
of this work are summarized as follows:
• By utilizing location-specific property of wireless channels and considering hard-
ware impairments to authenticate transmitters, we first develop a new channel-
based authentication scheme for massive MIMO systems with non-ideal hard-
ware.
• To calculate the quantity caused by hardware impairments on authentication
performance, we formulate channel estimation under hardware impairments and
determine error covariance matrix based on linear minimum mean square error
technique.
• Using the quantization result, matrix and hypothesis testing theories, we analyt-
ically model FA and SD probabilities under different channel covariance matrix
models. Simulation results are also provided to validate theoretical modeling of
the two probabilities.
• Through the theoretical models, we further examine how different levels of hard-
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ware impairments impact authentication performance, and also determine how
to set antennas correlation pattern and the number of base station antennas to
achieve a required authentication performance.
1.2.2 Physical Layer Authentication Jointly Utilizing Channel and Phase
Noise in MIMO Systems
Extensive research efforts have been devoted to the study on joint estimation of
channel and phase noise in MIMO systems [22–24]. The problem of joint estima-
tion of channel and phase noise is considered using data-aided and decision-directed
weighted least-squares approaches in MIMO systems [24]. These works mainly focus
on joint estimation of channel and phase noise without taking important security issue
into account in MIMO systems [22–25]. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, how
to develop a flexible and cost-effective authentication scheme by jointly utilizing the
wireless channel and hardware features, has not been considered. Based on the above
background, we explore physical layer authentication by jointly taking wireless chan-
nel and hardware features into account for authentication in heterogeneous coexist
MIMO systems. The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• By utilizing two physical layer features in terms of location-specific channel gains
and transmitter-specific phase noise to authenticate transmitters, we propose a
simple and flexible physical layer authentication scheme in MIMO systems to
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate transmitters. We analyze three
properties of this scheme: covertness, robustness, and security, which are three
important aspects to assess authentication schemes.
• To formulate variances of estimation errors in terms of channel gains and phase
noise, we adopt a maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) to estimate channel
gains and soft-input extended Kalman filter (EKF) to track phase noise over a
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frame, and then quantize the temporal variations of channel gains and phase
noise through the developed quantizers.
• By using quantization results and theories of hypothesis testing and stochastic
process, we derive the closed-form expressions for FA and MD probabilities
with a careful consideration of quantization errors. Simulation results are also
provided to validate theoretical models for the two probabilities.
• through theoretical models, we further investigate how thresholds (for channel
gain, phase noise, and decision) can impact the authentication performance.
Guidelines for properly setting these parameters are also provided to achieve a
desired authentication performance.
1.2.3 End-to-End Physical Layer Authentication for Dual-Hop Wireless
Networks
Existing works mainly focus on one-hop physical layer authentication, where trans-
mitters and receivers can communicate with each other directly. In the large-scale
distributed wireless networks such as IoT and 5G wireless systems [8], E2E commu-
nication is usually conducted with the help of relay(s) [26–28]. Due to transmission
efficiency, delay and secrecy constraints, the multi-hop E2E physical layer authentica-
tion is an important research issue in wireless communication scenarios, where relay
only needs to amplify and forward the signals transmitted by the transmitter to the
legitimate receiver, or to decode the signals and then forward them to the legitimate
receiver. To the best of our knowledge, the multi-hop E2E physical layer authenti-
cation is still not well-explored yet. Notice that the available one-hop physical layer
authentication schemes can not be directly extended to multi-hop E2E physical layer
authentication mainly due to the following challenges. First, the cascade channels
between the transmitter and receiver become much more dynamic and complicated,
6
making multi-hop E2E physical layer authentication more challenging [29]. Second,
the relay can be potential adversary to record the received signals and initiate replay
attacks, bringing new threat to the E2E physical layer authentication.
As one step towards the study of E2E multi-hop physical layer authentication,
this work focuses on the channel-based E2E physical layer authentication in a dual-
hop wireless network with an untrusted relay. This is because the dual-hop wireless
networks are simple and serve as a foundation for the study of general multi-hop wire-
less networks. By carefully exploiting the highly dynamic properties of the dual-hop
cascade channels, we develop an efficient E2E physical layer authentication scheme to
discriminate transmitters at different locations. The main contributions of this work
are summarized as follows.
• We propose a new E2E physical layer authentication scheme for dual-hop wire-
less networks with an untrusted relay. This scheme utilizes the location-specific
features of both channel gain (CA) and delay interval (DI) of cascaded chan-
nels to discriminate transmitters, and adopts the artificial jamming technique
to resist against possible replay attack from the untrusted relay.
• Using statistical signal estimation theory and the two-dimensional quantizers,
we can qualify the temporal variations of CA and DI of cascaded multipath
channel.
• Based on the hypothesis test theory, theoretical analysis is then conducted to
derive the expressions for FA and MD probabilities, such that E2E authentica-
tion performance under the proposed E2E physical layer authentication scheme
can be fully depicted.
• Finally, extensive numerical/simulation results are provided to validate theoret-
ical results for FA and MD probabilities and to illustrate performance for the
proposed scheme.
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Towards this end, we first focus on authenticating transmitters in massive MIMO
systems with non-ideal hardware, designing a new channel-based authentication scheme
with hardware impairments taken into account. We then develop a flexible and cost-
effective authentication scheme, which jointly utilizes two physical layer features (such
as wireless channel and hardware features). Finally, we examine the E2E physi-
cal layer authentication in a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay and
propose a corresponding physical layer authentication scheme which utilizes wireless
channel feature (i.e., channel impulse response in the dimensions of gain and path
delay).
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter II introduces the
related works of this thesis. In Chapter III, we focus on the study of channel-based
authentication under taking hardware impairments into account. Chapter IV presents
the work on an improved channel-based authentication scheme jointly utilizes two
physical layer features and Chapter V introduces the work regarding the E2E channel-
based authentication scheme in a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay.
Finally, we conclude this thesis in Chapter VI.
1.4 Notations
The main notations of this thesis are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Main notations
Symbol Definition
A/B/E/R Alice/Bob/Eve/Relay
X an unknown transmitter
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PF/PM/PD false alarm/missed detection/successful detection probability
δh/δθ channel gain/phase noise threshold
SNR signal-to-noise ratio
SINR signal to interference plus noise ratio
hi,j channel coefficient between entity i and j
E[·] expectation operator
Pr(·) probability operator
(·)∗ conjugate operator
(·)T transpose operator
(·)H conjugate transpose operator
| · | absolute value operator
C
M×K set of complex-valued M ×K matrices
Cov(·) covariance operator
det(·) determinant operator
, definition operator
tr(·) matrix trace function
diag[λ1, ..., λM ] diagonal matrix with λ1, ..., λM on main diagonal
exp(·) exponential function
Γχ2i (·) the right-tail probability function for a χ2i random variable with
i degrees of freedom
H0 null hypothesis
H1 alternative hypothesis
9

CHAPTER II
Related Works
This chapter introduces the existing works related to our study of the thesis, in-
cluding wireless channel-based authentication, hardware impairments-based authen-
tication, and tag-based authentication solutions.
2.1 Wireless Channel-based Authentication
The main idea of channel-based authentication is that channel state information
is location-specific according to the radio propagation theory [30]. It is difficult for
an adversary to precisely build the same channel that is being used by a legitimate
transmitter-received pair. The authors in [31] presented a channel-based authenti-
cation scheme exploiting the spatial variability of channel frequency response over
time-varying channels in a rich scattering environment. The authors in [12] further
explored the channel-based authentication by using the temporal channel variations
of channel impulse response to authenticate transmitters at different locations in
frequency-selective Rayleigh channels. An new physical layer authentication frame-
work was designed in [32] based on the hypothesis testing under a multiple wiretap
channels with correlated fading. The authors studied the optimal attack strategy for
the cases of both single attempt and multiple repeated trials under some degree of
among correlated wireless channels. The authors in [33] examined a single-carrier time
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domain method through either residual testing or time-domain wireless channel state
information (CSI) comparison. The authors in [34] proposed a physical layer authen-
tication scheme by using the unique CSI of a legitimate transmitter to authenticate
subsequent transmissions (frames) from the claimed entity. This scheme relies on
comparing two random CSIs to ascertain whether they have identical power spectral
densities. Based on the comparison of channel estimates obtained from the received
messages, an outer bound on the type I/II error probability region was investigated
in [35]. Here, multivariate Gaussian vectors were utilized to model channel estimates
when only some side information on the channel estimates is available at the adver-
sary. The authors explored the attacking strategy that presents the tightest bound
on the error region. The authors in [14] proposed a novel authentication scheme over
time-varying multipath channels by jointly using the location-specific properties of
both amplitude and multipath delay of wireless channels to authenticate transmit-
ters. The authors in [13] further proposed a logistic regression-based authentication
exploiting channel state information and multiple landmarks to improve the spoofing
detection accuracy.
2.2 Hardware Impairment-based Authentication
Hardware impairments-based authentication identifies transmitters by using in-
herent transmitter-specific hardware imperfections (e.g., phase noise and frequency
error, in-phase/quadrature (I/Q), and carrier frequency offset (CFO)). The authors
in [36] explored various non-cryptographic mechanisms for device authentication in
wireless networks through physical layer features or information. Merits and demer-
its of these authentication solutions and the practical implementation issues are also
discussed. The scheme proposed in [15] leverages minor hardware impairments to
identify a frame’s device-of-origin by analyzing radio-frequency signals. As an at-
tempt toward a model-based method using statistical models of radio frequency (RF)
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device components, the authors in [37] designed an algorithms based on statistical
signal processing methods to utilize non-linearities of wireless devices for authen-
tication. They also examined the practical variations of device chain components
through simulations, measurements and manufacturers’ specifications. The authors
in [38] further showed that time domain analysis of a pair of distortion signals caused
by imperfections of manufacturing processes can be used to discriminate wireless de-
vices. By using device-specific hardware impairment I/Q imbalance, the authors in
[39] proposed a new relay authentication scheme to secure amplify-and forward relay
networks. In [39], the generalized likelihood ratio test for classical linear model and
a two-parameter hypothesis testing were formulated to improve the authentication
performance in differentiating delicate difference between I/Q imbalances. By utiliz-
ing oscillators in each transmitter-and-receiver pair, the authors in [40] developed an
authentication scheme based on radio frequency time-varying CFO associated with
each pair of wireless devices.
Radio-frequency distinct native attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting was developed
to authenticate transmitters in [41]. By exploiting RF-DNA fingerprints consisting of
higher order statistical features, e.g., instantaneous amplitude, phase, and frequency
responses, transmitter authentication can be implemented. The authors showed de-
vice classification with dimensional reduction analysis (DRA) feature subsets. The
multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) classification models are used to assess verifica-
tion accuracy in [42]. [43] The authors developed a technique acquiring actively and
passively wireless devices fingerprint through information emitting by devices. This
fingerprint is a function of different device hardware impairments and variations in
devices’ clock skew. Then, the fingerprint is exploited to identify physical device and
device type. By considering diverse hardware impairments (such as circuits, antenna,
and environments), the authors in [16] explore a reliability and differentiability of
physical layer authentication by means of theoretical modeling and experiment val-
13
idation. It is notable that the above authentication schemes exploit either intrinsic
features of wireless channels or inherent hardware impairments to authenticate trans-
mitters separately.
2.3 Tag-based Authentication
Note that tag-based PHY-layer authentication, which embeds tag signals to modu-
lated signals for identifying devices, is regarded as a promising authentication solution.
Such a method has two major advantages over conventional authentication technolo-
gies. First, it enables a legitimate receiver to quickly identify transmitters without
having to complete higher-layer processing. Second, embedding authentication tag
into message signals and simultaneously transmitting them through wireless chan-
nels allow adversaries to obtain only the noisy observation of authentication tag [44–
48]. Tag-based PHY-layer authentication has been extensively explored in traditional
wireless network architectures. The authors in [44] investigated a cryptography secure
low-power authentication method that hides tag signals in the modulated signals for
authentication. The authors in [45] presented an improved tag-based authentication
scheme, where tag conveys much less information of the secret key to adversaries. In
[46], the authors implemented extensive experiments in software defined radio system
in order to illustrate the authentication performance of the tag-based authentication.
The authors in [47] proposed a blind tag-based authentication scheme, which adopts
the techniques of blind known interference cancellation and differential processing to
conduct authentication. The authors in [48] proposed a slope tag-based PHY-layer
authentication scheme which is covert to the unware receiver, robust to interference,
and secure for authentication.
It is notable, however, that there are some problems for the above aforementioned
authentication solutions.
1) These authentication solutions mainly focus on authenticating in non-massive
14
MIMO systems. It is demonstrated that the presence of hardware impairments not
only limits capacity but also deteriorates channel estimation accuracy in the high-
power regime. Therefore, channel estimation accuracy is affected by hardware im-
pairments, thermal noise, and multiuser interference. It is worth noting that for
overall system performance, considering aggregate effect of all impairments has more
substantial benefits than considering separately individual behavior of each hardware
module. It is important to design a new channel-based authentication approach by
taking aggregate effort of hardware impairments for MIMO systems into account.
2) How to develop a flexible and cost-effective authentication scheme jointly uti-
lizing the wireless channel and hardware features has not been considered.
3) The above available works mainly focus on one hop physical layer authentica-
tion, where transmitters and receivers can communicate with each other directly. In
the large-scale distributed wireless networks like 5G wireless systems, ad hoc networks
and wireless sensor networks, the E2E communication is usually conducted with the
help of relay(s), making the muti-hop E2E authentication an important research issue.
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CHAPTER III
Physical Layer Authentication for Massive MIMO
Systems with Hardware Impairments
Hardware impairments need to be deliberately considered in the design of future ef-
fective physical layer authentication scheme in massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) systems, which will serve as an essential technology in meeting the continu-
ously increasing throughput demands and spectrum efficiency for the fifth generation
(5G) and beyond networks. In this chapter, we focus on authenticating transmitters
in massive MIMO systems with non-ideal hardware. We propose a new channel-
based authentication scheme with hardware impairments being taken into account.
In particular, based on signal processing theory, we first formulate channel estima-
tion under hardware impairments and determine its error covariance matrix. With
the help of hypothesis testing and matrix transformation theories, we are then able
to derive exact expressions for the probabilities of false alarm and detection under
different channel covariance matrix models. Finally, extensive simulations are carried
out to validate theoretical results and illustrate the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
Impacts of system parameters on performance are revealed as well.
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Figure 3.1: System model.
3.1 SYSTEM MODEL
3.1.1 Network Model
As illustrated in Fig. 3.1, we consider an uplink massive MIMO system consisting
of three different entities: one M-antenna base station (namely Bob), two single-
antenna mobile terminals (namely Alice and Eve). To ensure independent fading
channels, any two entities are assumed to be far away from each other, with a distance
far more than spatial separation of a wavelength (e.g., 6 cm for a typical 5 GHz RF
system). This assumption is reasonable because when the distance between entities
is less than one wavelength, they will fail to work well due to strong interference
[12, 14]. Alice is a legitimate transmitter to the intended receiver Bob. Eve serves
as an adversary who attempts to steal some useful information and/or to inject his
own aggressive signals into the network by impersonating Alice. Suppose that Bob
receives two messages (also referred to as frames) at time k − 1 and time k. We
assume that the first one is confirmed being from Alice by using a standard higher-
layer protocol [12], and Bob stores the channel connecting Alice with him. The other
one, received by Bob at time k, is either from Alice or Eve. Therefore, the objective
for Bob is to differentiate between Alice and Eve. The message to be authenticated
is not expected to be sent continuously but it is necessary to ensure the continuity of
18
authentication process by probing the channel at time intervals smaller than channel
coherence time [31].
3.1.2 Channel Model
We first introduce the following definitions on fading channels:
• Spatial channel correlation: A fading channel h ∈ CM×1 is spatially un-
correlated, if channel gain ‖h‖2 and channel direction h/‖h‖ following uniform
distribution over unit-sphere in CM×1 are uncorrelated random variables. Oth-
erwise, it is spatially correlated.
• Temporal channel correlation: A fading channel h ∈ CM×1 is temporally
correlated, if each channel component remains constant over one frame and is
continuously varying from one frame to the next due to the relative motion
between entities and such temporal variations are correlated.
Similar to the work in [14, 31, 47], we consider that channels from the same
transmitter-receiver pair are temporally correlated and follow Rayleigh fading chan-
nel. The temporally correlated channel may be either spatially independent or spa-
tially correlated.
We use hX(k) = [hX,1(k) · · ·hX,M(k)]T ∈ CM×1 to denote channel vector be-
tween X and Bob at time k, and then we have hX(k) ∼ CN (0,RX) where RX =
E{hX(k)hHX(k)} ∈ CM×M is a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix. Following ex-
isting related literature [12], it is assumed that the statistical information of channel
is available at Bob. This assumption is generic and has been adopted in the literature
[12, 49].
Here, we exemplify temporal channel variations. We first focus on the time-
autocorrelation of channels, which is caused by the Doppler rate. Similar to [31, 50],
we assume that the temporal variations of the channel between Alice and Bob are
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mutually independent and the normalized maximum Doppler frequencies are iden-
tical. Let f denote the normalized maximum Doppler frequency. According to the
well-known Jakes’ model [30], the time-autocorrelation matrix of hA(k) for an arbi-
trary time lag ks can be written as ΨA[ks] = E{hA(k)h∗A[k + ks]} = RAJ0(2πfks),
where J0(·) is the zeroth order Bessel function of the first kind. Similar to [47, 50],
a first-order Gauss-Markov process is employed to model the fluctuation of channel
state. According to [47, 50], correlation coefficient matrix of hA(k) can be defined as
ΨA(ks)R
−1
A . Thus, we have
hA(k) = αhA(k − 1) +
√
1− α2eA(k), (3.1)
where α is temporal correlation coefficient and eA(k) ∼ CN (0,RA) is independent of
hA(k − 1).
3.1.3 Communication Model with Hardware Impairments
In practical applications, transceivers always suffer from hardware impairments.
The impact of hardware impairments on signals mainly includes two aspects: 1) the
signal that is actually generated and transmitted does not agree with the intended
one; 2) the received signal is distorted during reception processing. Such impairments
are treated as the additional distortion noise which are in general relevant to signal
power as well as channel gain. Various sources of impairments (e.g., I/Q imbalance
and phase noise) may result in distortion noise [17].
In order to characterize non-ideal hardware impairments more accurately, we
adopt the communication model with the aggregate residual hardware impairments,
which are characterized by independent additive distortion noises at the transmitter
and receiver as in [17]. Considering the authentication performance for a system,
this is reasonable because considering the aggregate effect of all the residual hard-
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ware impairments is more significant than considering residual hardware impairments
separately/individually.
Frame-by-frame transmission is considered. A transmission frame consists of de-
terministic pilot symbols used for channel estimation and stochastic data symbols.
Suppose an unknown mobile transmitter X tries to send a frame to be authenticated
to Bob at time k. Let s(k) ∈ C denote the deterministic pilot signal transmitted by X
at time k and let p = E{|s(k)|2} denote the average power of s(k). Let ν(k) ∈ CM×1
denote an ergodic process comprised of zero-mean complex additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) νN(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2NI) and interference from other simultaneous trans-
missions νI(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2II), which is independent of s(k). Then, the signal received
by Bob at time k can be written as
yBX(k) = hX(k)(s(k) + ηX(k)) + ηB(k) + ν(k), (3.2)
where ηX(k) ∈ C and ηB(k) ∈ CM×1 denote the independent additional distortion
noises at X and Bob at time k, respectively. According to [17, 20], ergodic stochastic
processes can model the aggregate residual impairments at X and Bob. Note that
distortion noise caused by hardware impairments is irrelevant to s(k), but statisti-
cally depend on channel realizations. Also, this distortion noise follows a complex
Gaussian distribution for a given channel realization, which is verified experimen-
tally and supported by several theoretical results [17, 20]. Specifically, under a given
hX(k) the conditional distributions are ηX ∼ CN (0, ςX) and ηB ∼ CN (0,ΥB),
respectively, wherein ςX can be modeled as ςX = κXp and ΥB can modeled as
ΥB = κBpdiag[|hX1(k)|2, ..., |hXM (k)|2], where both κX , κB ≥ 0 characterize levels of
hardware impairments at X and Bob, respectively. They commonly remain constants
and are closely related to error vector magnitude (EVM), which is in general used to
measure the quality of hardware. The relationship between EVM and κ-parameters
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Table 3.1: EVM requirements for different modulation methods
Modulation scheme Required EVM
QPSK 0.175
16-QAM 0.125
64-QAM 0.080
256-QAM 0.035
is illustrated by an example: EVM at X can be formulated as
EVMX =
√
E{|ηX(k)|2}
E{|s(k)|2} =
√
κX . (3.3)
Remark 1 A small EVM result is required in the transmitter and receiver for correct
demodulation when modulation density increases. Table 3.1 illustrates how 3GPP LTE
standard EVM requirements for terminal equipment get tighter as modulation density
increases. We also notice that for QAM (quadrature amplitude modulation) in 5G
(256-QAM initially and up to 1024-QAM in the future), the constellation points are
much closer to each other, so a better EVM performance is required. However, this
work focuses on the impact of different levels of hardware impairments (for different
modulation densities) on authentication performance. Therefore, we set κ-parameters
in the range [0, 0.152] (large κ-parameters correspond to low-cost constrained devices)
to clearly present authentication performance of the proposed scheme.
Remark 2 Modeling of the aggregate residual hardware impairments has been sup-
ported and validated by many theoretical investigations and measurements (see e.g.,
[17, 20, 21], and references therein).
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3.2 Proposed Physical Layer Authentication Scheme
The basic principle for the proposed scheme is that channels are location-specific,
which has been widely adopted for transmitters authentication to complement and
improve traditional security approaches [12, 14, 31, 51]. Most importantly, this is
supported by the well-known Jakes model [30], which states that the received signal
rapidly decorrelates over a distance of half a wavelength, and that spatial separation
of one to two wavelengths leads to independent fading channels. Therefore, it is
difficult (if not impossible) for an attacker to generate or accurately model the signal
that is transmitted and received by entities. In other words, the channels between
different geographic locations decorrelate rapidly in space due to path loss and fading
[30, 31, 36]. Moreover, Eve cannot arrive at Alice’s previous location for a typical
moving speed 1 m/s and time interval of probing channel 3 ms (please refer to [12]).
Consequently, the channel between Alice and Bob is independent of that between Eve
and Bob, i.e., hA(k) is independent of hE(k). Meanwhile, the channel for the same
transmitter-receiver pair is correlated over time. Hence, location-specific channel can
be used to authenticate transmitters. The proposed scheme includes two processes:
Channel estimation with hardware impairments process and decision criterion process.
3.2.1 Channel Estimation
If RX,diag = diag[r11, ..., rMM ] consists of diagonal elements of RX , the covariance
matrix of yBX(k) according to (3.2) is denoted as
RyBX = E{yBX(k)yHBX(k)} = p(1 + κX)RX + pκBRX,diag + (σ2I + σ2N)I. (3.4)
Let hˆX(k) denote the estimation of hX(k) and then by using linear minimum mean
square error estimator [17] we have hˆX(k) = s
∗(k)RXR
−1
yBX
yBX(k). Then, we can
establish the following lemma on channel estimation with hardware impairments. The
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proof is straightforward, and a similar one can be found in [17].
Lemma 1 hˆX(k) can be decomposed as
hˆX(k) = hX(k)− ǫX(k). (3.5)
where ǫX(k) ∈ CM×1 ∼ CN (0,RǫX) is estimation error vector and uncorrelated to
ht[k]; and RǫX is given by
RǫX = E{ǫX(k)ǫHX(k)} = RX − pRXR−1yBXRX . (3.6)
As observed from (3.4) and (3.6), levels of hardware impairments of different
transmitter-receiver pairs lead to different error covariance matrices under the same
AWGN and interference. More precisely, a larger level of hardware impairments will
lead to a worse estimation error. It is also notable that when κ equals zero, i.e., for
ideal hardware, estimation error only comes from AWGN and interference.
3.2.2 Decision Criterion
Based on the above results, Bob can utilize a binary hypothesis test to decide
whether the current message is still from legitimate transmitter Alice. In other words,
it helps to test whether the current channel estimation at time k is analogous to the
previous ones at time k − 1. Therefore, the hypothesis test can be formulated as
H0 : hˆX(k) = hˆA(k),
H1 : hˆX(k) = hˆE(k),
(3.7)
where the null hypothesis H0 represents that the current transmitter is still Alice,
i.e., X = A. In contrast, the alternative hypothesis H1 represents that the current
transmitter is adversary Eve, i.e., X = E.
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The proposed scheme utilizes location-specific channels to authenticate transmit-
ters, by comparing the difference between the previous and the current channel am-
plitude with a threshold. This work considers that Bob receives two messages (i.e.,
frames) at time k − 1 and time k. The first one received by Bob at time k − 1 is
validated as from Alice by using a standard higher-layer protocol, and thus Bob esti-
mates the channel connecting Alice with him. At time k, Bob can estimate channel
connecting a current transmitter (i.e., Alice or Eve) with him through pilot signals.
Although the proposed scheme relies on other higher-layer protocols to validate the
identity of the previous legitimate transmitter, for subsequent authentication it en-
ables a receiver to quickly differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate transmit-
ters without complete higher-layer processing. In this work, both channel covariance
matrices (statistical CSI) associated with Alice and Eve are available for Bob by us-
ing some techniques such as geographical information systems and remote sensing
information of interest. Then, Bob will implement authentication by comparing the
difference between hˆA(k − 1) and hˆX(k) with a threshold.
To achieve effective authentication, it is of great significance to establish the likeli-
hood ratio test (LRT) for the developed hypothesis test. For notational convenience,
let x = [x1 · · ·xM ]T denote the difference between the current and previous channel
estimations with xm representing the m
th component, i.e., x = hˆX(k) − hˆA(k − 1),
where hˆA(k − 1) is stored by Bob at time k − 1. We use Ci (i = 0, 1) to denote
covariance matrices of x on the two hypotheses.
Lemma 2 The LRT for the hypothesis test in (3.7) is defined as
L(x) , xH∆Qx
H1
≷
H0
δ, (3.8)
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Ci =
{
2(1− α)RA + 2(RA − pRAR−1yB,ARA), i = 0, (3.10a)
2RA − pRAR−1yBARA + 2RE − pRER−1yBERE, i = 1. (3.10b)
where L(x) is sufficient statistic and δ is decision threshold, and ∆Q can be given by
∆Q = C−10 KC
−1
1 , (3.9)
where Ci(i = 0, 1) is given in (3.10), C1 = C0 +K, and K is given by
K = 2RE − pRER−1yBERE + pRAR−1yBARA − 2(1− α)RA. (3.11)
Proof 1 See Appendix A.1.
It is important to note that L(x) is a function of x and ∆Q, which has the
property that L0(x) can be determined as a function of L(x). Thus, based on the
value of L(x), Bob can discriminate between Alice and Eve.
Remark 3 To meet extreme data demand growth, it is a promising solution for fu-
ture wireless systems (e.g., 5G networks) and mmWave communication systems to
operate in the frequency range of 30–300 GHz. Higher frequencies adopted in these
systems will require shorter inter-site distances to ensure message transmissions, caus-
ing changes in fading characteristics. The proposed scheme utilizes location-specific
channels to authenticate transmitters. Therefore, slower fading or without fading
might contribute to improving authentication performance. This will be proved by
numerical results in Section 3.4.3.
Remark 4 In massive MIMO systems, spatial diversity leads to channel hardening,
meaning that a fading channel behaves as if it were a non-fading channel (please refer
to [52] for details). Channel hardening has two significant advantages. One is the
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improved reliability of having a nearly deterministic channel. The other is almost
little estimation error for channels realization. Therefore, these advantages allow us
to completely exploit location-specific wireless channels to differentiate between the
legitimate transmitter and illegitimate one, by taking aggregate residual hardware im-
pairments into account. As shown in Section 3.4.3, less fluctuation in channel gain
(i.e., tending to hardening) will obtain better authentication performance.
3.3 Modeling of FA and SD Probabilities
In this section, we first explore the behaviors of the LRT in (3.8) for diverse
channel covariance models, and then utilize these behavior results to derive analytical
expressions for PF and PD.
According to Section 3.1.2, the channel for the same transmitter-receiver pair can
be either spatially independent (uncorrelated) or correlated. Against this background,
we need to analyze each case in detail to find analytical expressions for PF and PD.
3.3.1 Spatially Independent Channel
For spatially independent case, channel components may be independent and iden-
tically distributed (IID) or independent but with unequal variances (IUV). We give
the following lemmas on distributions of eigenvalues of Ci under IID and IUV cases.
When the temporally correlated channel components are spatially IID (i.e., spatio-
temporal), RX can be denoted as RX = σ
2
XI, where σ
2
X is the variance of hX,m. Then,
by substituting RX into (3.4), RyBX becomes
RyBX = λyBXI, (3.12)
where λyBX = (p(1 + κX + κB)σ
2
X + σ
2
I + σ
2
N ).
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Lemma 3 When the temporally correlated channel components are spatially IID, Ci
given in (3.10) can be further written as
Ci =


λC0I, if i = 0,
(λC0 + λK)I, if i = 0.
(3.13)
where
λC0 = 2(1− α)σ2A + 2(σ2A − pσ4A/λyBA), (3.14a)
λC1 = λC0 + λK, (3.14b)
λK = 2σ
2
E −
pσ4E
λyBE
+
pσ4A
λyBA
− 2(1− α)σ2A. (3.14c)
Proof 2 When the temporally correlated channel components are spatially IID, RA,
RE, RyBA, and RyBE are diagonal matrices. Based on (3.5), (3.10), and (3.12), one
can see that Ci are also diagonal matrices. Substituting RX = σ
2
XI and RyBX = λyBXI
into (3.10) yields (3.13).
When the temporally correlated channel components are spatially IUV, RX can
be denoted as
RX = diag[σ
2
X,1, ..., σ
2
X,M ]. (3.15)
Substituting (3.15) into (3.4), RyBX becomes
RyBX = diag[λyBA,1 , ..., λyBA,M ], (3.16)
where λyBA,m =
(
p(1 + κX + κB)σ
2
A,m + σ
2
I + σ
2
N
)
.
Lemma 4 When the temporally correlated channel components are spatially IUV, Ci
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given in (3.10) can be written as
Ci = diag[λCi,1, ..., λCi,M ], (3.17)
where
λC0,m = (4− 2α)σ2A,m −
2pσ4A,m
λyBA,m
, (3.18a)
λC1,m = λC0,m + λK,m, (3.18b)
λK,m = 2σ
2
E,m − 2(1− α)σ2A,m −
pσ4E,m
λyBE,m
+
pσ4A,m
λyBA,m
. (3.18c)
Proof 3 When the temporally correlated channel components are spatially IUV, all
RA, RE, RyBA , and RyBE are diagonal matrices. Thus, based on (3.5), (3.10), and
(3.12), we know that Ci is also diagonal matrix. Substituting (3.15) and (3.16) into
(3.10), we can obtain (3.17).
Based on the above lemmas, PF and PD under IID and IUV cases are summarized
in the following theorem.
Theorem III.1 Consider the uplink massive MIMO system with hardware impair-
ments over spatially independent time-varying channel components. Under IID and
IUV cases PF and PD can be given in (3.19) and (3.20), respectively, where λC0 and
λK are given in Lemma 3, am =
λK,m
λC0,m+λK,m
and cm =
λK,m
λC0,m
, in which λC0,m and λK,m
are given in Lemma 4, and δ is a decision threshold.
Proof 4 See Appendix A.2.
These results show that we can calculate PF and PD through standard mathe-
matical functions under the temporally correlated and spatially independent channel
components. It is interesting that ∆Q is a diagonal matrix (since Ci is a diagonal
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PF =


Γχ22M
((
λC0
λK
+ 1
)
δ
)
, if IID, (3.19a)
M∑
m=1

 M∏
i=1
i 6=m
am
am − ai

 exp(− δ
am
)
, if IUV. (3.19b)
PD =


Γχ22M
(
λC0
λK
δ
)
, if IID, (3.20a)
M∑
m=1

 M∏
i=1
i 6=m
cm
cm − ci

 exp(− δ
cm
)
, if IUV. (3.20b)
matrix). These analytical results enable us to evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed scheme taking hardware impairment into account under spatially independent
time-varying channel components.
3.3.2 Spatially Correlated Channel
In practice, the channels between different antennas are spatially correlated due
to the following reasons. First, it is well-known that spatial correlation is relevant
to antenna separation, which is rarely larger owing to large-scale nature of massive
MIMO systems. Second, channels may tend to a point in some directions [17]. Third,
for antenna, there exists spatially dependent pattern when setting short antenna
space and large angular spread, causing channels between adjacent antennas spatially
correlated [17, 53, 54]. Therefore, for massive MIMO systems, spatial correlation
properties of channels between adjacent antennas always exist. We generate channel
covariance matrix RX (X = {A,E}) via exponential correlation model in [53]. In
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fact, it is expressed by a M ×M complex Toeplitz matrix [55]. That is,
RX = σ
2
X


1 ρ∗X · · · (ρ∗X)M−1
ρX 1 · · · (ρ∗X)M−2
...
...
. . .
...
ρM−1X ρ
M−2
X · · · 1


, (3.21)
where σ2X and ρX (here 0 < |ρX | ≤ 1, and when |ρX | = 0, channel components are
spatially uncorrelated) are arbitrary scaling factor and correlation coefficient between
adjacent antennas, respectively. Note that the eigenvalue spread in RX depends on
|ρX |. Hence, we need to consider different |ρX | to derive exact expressions for PF and
PD. Combining (3.10) and (3.11), we will obtain the following lemma.
When the temporally correlated channel components are fully correlated in space
(i.e., |ρX | = 1), we have RX = σ2XρXρHX , where ρX = [1 · · ·1M−1]T . We use λX,m to
denote the mth eigenvalue of RX , and then we have λX,1 = Mσ
2
X and the remaining
eigenvalues are zero, i.e., λX,2 = · · · = λX,M = 0. Thus, we have
RX = diag[Mσ
2
X , 0, ..., 0], (3.22)
Thus, we have RA = diag[Mσ
2
A, 0, ..., 0] and RE = diag[Mσ
2
E , 0, ..., 0]. Substituting
RA and RE into (3.4) yields
λyBX,1 = p(1 + κX)Mσ
2
X + pκBσ
2
X + σ
2
I + σ
2
N . (3.23)
Lemma 5 When the temporally correlated channel components are fully correlated
in space (i.e., |ρX | = 1), Ci given in (3.10) becomes
Ci = diag[λCi,1, 0, ..., 0], (3.24)
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where
λC0,1 = (4− 2α)Mσ2A −
2pM2σ4A
λyBA,1
, (3.25a)
λC1,1 = λC0,1 + λK,1, (3.25b)
λK,1 =M
(
2σ2E − 2(1− α)σ2A −
pMσ4E
λyBE,1
+
pMσ4A
λyBA,1
)
. (3.25c)
Proof 5 When the temporally correlated channel components are fully correlated in
space, i.e., |ρX | = 1, according to (3.10) and (3.22), Ci has one non-zero eigenvalue
and M − 1 zero eigenvalues. Combining (3.22) and (3.23), we can obtain (3.24).
When 0 < |ρX| < 1, the eigenvalues of RX are distinct and can be found nu-
merically. Let the eigendecomposition of RX be RX = uXΛXu
H
X , where uX is
an M ×M matrix [56]; and ΛX = diag[λX,1, ..., λX,M ] with λX,m denoting the mth
eigenvalue of RX . From (3.4), we can see that the eigendecomposition of RyBX is
RyBX = uXΛyBXu
H
X , where ΛyBX = diag[λyBX,1, ..., λyBX,M ] with λyBX,m = p(1 +
κX)λX,m + pκBσ
2
X + σ
2
I + σ
2
N .
To analyze the behavior of the LRT defined in (3.8) under the non-diagonal chan-
nel covariance model, we need to transform ∆Q to a diagonal matrix by a two-
step transformation due to different correlation coefficients for RA and RE (i.e.,
|ρA| 6= |ρE|).
We first do eigendecomposition for C0, that is, C0 = uAΛ0u
H
A , where Λ0 =
diag[λC0,1, ..., λC0,M ] with λC0,m representing the m
th eigenvalue of C0. It is easily
to see from (3.21) that the rank of Λ0 is M . We define decorrelating transformation
wH , [Λ0]−
1
2uHA , and then apply it to x on H0 to obtain xw = w
Hx. Since RA is
Hermitian, we have uHA = u
−1
A . The covariance matrix of xw on H0 is I. On H1, its
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covariance matrix is denoted by
R1w = E{xwxHw |H1} = wHC1w = wHDw + I. (3.26)
Let RDw = w
HDw, and it is a non-diagonal matrix because D contains RE and thus
wH could not decorrelate D. Therefore, we now need to do an eigendecomposition of
RDw:
RDw = uDwΛDwu
H
Dw, (3.27)
where uDw is an M ×M modal matrix; ΛDw = diag[λDw,1, ..., λDw,M ] with λDw,m
denoting the mth eigenvalue of RDw. It is noticed that RDw may not be full rank
matrix. Hence, we augment the eigenvectors if its rank is not M . The eigende-
composition of R1w is R1w = uDw[ΛDw + I]u
H
Dw = uDwΛ1wu
H
Dw, where Λ1w =
diag[λDw,1 + 1, ..., λDw,M + 1].
Based on the above lemmas, PF and PD under the spatially correlated channel
are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem III.2 Consider the uplink massive MIMO system with hardware impair-
ments over spatially correlated time-varying channel. Under the spatially correlated
channel case, PF and PD of the proposed scheme can be given in (3.28) and (3.29),
respectively, where λwu,m =
λDwm
λDw,m+1
.
Proof 6 See Appendix A.3.
This indicates that we can evaluate the authentication performance of the proposed
scheme for the channel following the zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution with
an arbitrary covariance matrix. The key to deriving the closed-form expressions for
PF and PD is that complex eigenvalue corresponds to two equal real eigenvalues. Also,
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PF =


exp
(
−δ
(
1 +
λC0,1
λK,1
))
, if |ρA| = |ρE | = 1, (3.28a)
M∑
m=1

 M∏
i=1
i 6=m
λwu,m
λwu,m − λwu,i

 exp(− δ
λwu,m
)
, if 0 < |ρA|, |ρE| < 1.(3.28b)
PD =


exp
(
−δλC0,1
λK,1
)
, if |ρA| = |ρE | = 1, (3.29a)
M∑
m=1

 M∏
i=1
i 6=m
λDw,m
λDw,m − λDw,i

 exp(− δ
λDw,m
)
, if 0 < |ρA|, |ρE| < 1.(3.29b)
utilizing eigendecomposition and diagonalizing operations we can transform an arbi-
trary channel covariance matrix model to the case in which ∆Q is a diagonal matrix
whose elements are functions with respect to eigenvalues. By studying various models,
we can obtain analytical performance results that enable us to understand how chan-
nel models (or channel covariance matrix models) affect authentication performance.
3.3.3 Unknown Parameters
If Bob has no knowledge of parameters such as RA, RE, α, κA, κE , and κB, he
can exploit the following LRT to identify the current transmitter
L(x) = 1
σ2N + σ
2
I
M∑
m=1
|xm|2 = 1
σ2N + σ
2
I
M∑
m=1
|hˆX,m(k)− hˆA,m(k − 1)|2
H1
≷
H0
δ. (3.30)
In this case, we only have numerical results for PF and PD (which will be illustrated
in Section 3.4.3).
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Table 3.2: System parameters affecting authentication performance
Parameter Description
SINR Signal to interference plus noise ratio
κ The ratio of the level of hardware impairment for E and A
γ The ratio of locally averaged channel gains for E-B and A-B
α Temporal correlation coefficient of hA
ρ Spatial correlation coefficient between adjacent antennas
M The number of base station antennas
3.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we verify theoretical results through simulations and reveal how
system parameters affect the authentication performance of the proposed scheme.
3.4.1 System Parameters and Simulation Settings
System parameters that determine authentication performance (PF , PD) are listed
in Table 5.1. In particular, signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) is defined
as SINR = p tr(R)
M(σ2I+σ
2
N )
. The ratio of the levels of hardware impairments for Eve and
Alice is defined as κ = κE
κA
. According to the EVM ranges introduced in Section 3.1.3,
we consider four typical levels of impairments: κA, κB, κE ∈ {0, 0.052, 0.12, 0.152}.
Therefore, if we fix κA, we can adjust κE to achieve a specified κ. Moreover, γ =
tr(RE)
tr(RA)
denotes the ratio of locally averaged channel gains for Alice-Bob and Eve-Bob.
In addition, α is temporal correlation coefficient of hA, and ρA and ρE are spatial
correlation coefficients between adjacent antennas for hA and hE , respectively. In our
simulation, we assume ρA = ρE = ρ.
To validate the derived results of PF and PD, we develop a dedicated simulator
based on Matlab. The simulation method in [57] and exponential correlation model in
[53] are exploited to generate time-varying MIMO channels and covariance matrices
of such channels, respectively. The quantity of temporal correlation of underlying
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Figure 3.2: ROC curves of the proposed scheme with the settings (γ = 0 dB, κ = 1.02,
M = 5, SINR = 10 dB, and α = 0.9).
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channels depends on normalized Doppler frequency, which is determined by the speed
of transmitter and carrier frequency. Therefore, for a given carrier frequency, the
normalized Doppler frequency is a function of the transmitter speed only. We consider
three fading channels (case I: slow-fading with α = 1; case II: fast-fading with α = 0.9;
and case III: faster-fading with α = 0.8) [58]. For Monte-Carlo experiments, 105
independent trials are conducted to obtain average results.
3.4.2 Model Validation
For simplicity, we assume κA = κB = κE . To verify our analytical results, we plot
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves in Fig. 3.2. Fig. 3.2 shows that
the simulation results match nicely with the theoretical ones for spatially independent
(IID, IUV) and spatially correlated channel components, so our theoretical results can
be used to accurately model PF and PD for an arbitrary channel covariance matrix.
As observed from Fig. 3.2 that for three different channel covariance matrix models
PD improves as PF increases. According to Neyman-Pearson criterion, it is required
to make PD as large as possible for a given PF constraint (commonly below 10
−1).
Also, we can see from Fig. 3.2 that for three channel covariance matrix models,
PD decreases with the levels of impairments when PF is fixed. In particular, when
κA = κB = κE = 0 (i.e., ideal hardware), we have the largest PD for three channel
covariance matrix cases; when κA = κB = κE = 0.15
2, we have the smallest PD;
for a fixed PF , the difference between the largest PD and smallest one can approach
0.3 under the same channel covariance matrix. This clearly reveals that hardware
impairments greatly deteriorate authentication performance.
From Fig. 3.2, we see that the choice of covariance model has a significant impact
the performance. The reason is that: for the spatially uncorrelated covariance model
(Fig. 3.2(a) and Fig. 3.2(b)), we have 2M real observations of channel component
estimation; decreasing ρ results in lower spatial correlation and thus improves PD;
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while for the spatially correlated covariance model (Fig. 3.2(c)) we have no more
than 2M real observations, especially when ρ = 1 we only have two real observations.
It is proved in [59] that the quantity of spatial correlation determines the number of
observations for channel component estimation and this is consistent with our results.
3.4.3 Authentication Performance Analysis
Based on theoretical models for PF and PD, we explore how system parameters
(e.g., κ, SINR, γ, α, and M) affect authentication performance under diverse channel
covariance matrix models. Meanwhile, we also examine performance under unknown
parameters case via numerical simulations.
We first explore how κ affect the performance for both scenarios (spatially un-
correlated and correlated channel components). We summarize in Fig. 3.3(a) the
ROC curves with some representative values of κ for spatially uncorrelated and cor-
related channel components. As shown in Fig. 3.3(a) that for all channel covariance
matrix models, performance monotonically improves as κ increases. In particular,
when κ = 1.52, the performance outperforms others; when κ = 0.52, we have the
worst performance. In other words, comparing with the legitimate transmitter, the
illegitimate one with lager level of impairments is easier to be detected. This tells us
that we should choose hardware with smaller level of impairments for secure wireless
communications.
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Figure 3.3: Authentication performance with the settings (γ = 0 dB, M = 5, SINR
= 10 dB, α = 0.9).
Next, we investigate the impact of SINR on PD for a fixed PF . Fig. 3.3(b) illus-
trates how PD varies with SINR with the settings (γ = 0 dB, κ = 1.0
2, M = 5, and
PF = 10
−2). We can see that under a fixed PF , increasing SINR leads to different
tendencies of PD for different channel model. In particular, PD improves as SINR in-
creases; the curves for spatially uncorrelated channel model (i.e., |ρ| = 0 for IID and
IUV) have better slope than that for spatially correlated channel model. For spatially
correlated channel model, the curves for ρ = 0.7 and ρ = 0.9 have the same slope
while that for ρ = 1 exhibits the smallest slope. This is because more concentrated
channel components in a lower dimensional subspace lead to insufficient observations.
This reveals that better PD performance is achieved as |ρ| → 0, since channel compo-
nents are more evenly distributed throughout the M-dimensional observation space.
Increasing transmit power can improve performance for both spatially uncorrelated
and correlated models. It is notable, however, that for general wireless networks ap-
plications, transmit power is limited to a certain level due to energy constraint and
interference requirement.
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Figure 3.4: Impacts of (γ, α) on ROC curve with the settings (SINR = 10 dB, κ =
1.52, M = 5).
Fig. 3.4(a) shows how performance varies with γ ∈ {−8 dB, 0 dB, 8 dB}, given that
SINR = 10 dB, κ = 1.52, M = 5, and α = 0.9. It is interesting to see from Fig. 3.4(a)
that for both channel covariance matrix models, the performance monotonically rises
as γ increases. More specifically, when γ = 8 dB, we have the best performance while
when γ = −8 dB we have the lowest one. This clearly indicates that if Eve is closer
to Bob, she might be successfully detected by Bob.
Fig. 3.4(b) demonstrates the impact of channel fading status on authentication
performance for spatial independence (IID) and correlation (|ρ| = 0.8) models, given
that γ = 0 dB, SINR = 10 dB, κ = 1.52, and M = 5. As seen from Fig. 3.4(b),
the authentication performance under case I outperforms that under the others (case
II and case III), while the scheme under case III provides the worst performance.
This indicates that channel-based authentication scheme can effectively differentiate
between Alice and Eve, while it might not work well in a highly dynamic environment.
Now, we present in Fig. 3.5 the impact of M ∈ {10, 16} on authentication per-
formance for IID and |ρ| = 0.8, given that γ = 0 dB, SINR = 10 dB, α = 0.9, and
κA = κB = κE ∈ {0, 0.12, 0.152}. The main observation from Fig. 3.5 is that the
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choice of channel covariance model has a large impact on performance. Moreover,
for a given covariance model, performance improves as M increases. When M = 16
under IID case, the proposed scheme for different levels of hardware impairments
has nearly indistinguishable performance (PD approaching 1), indicating that the
degrading of performance due to hardware impairments vanishes asymptotically in
large-dimensional vector space.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of M ∈ {10, 16} on performance, given that γ = 0 dB, SINR =
10 dB, α = 0.9, and κA = κB = κE ∈ {0, 0.12, 0.152}.
Furthermore, we explore how PD varies with κA for IID case with the settings
(κ = 1.02, SINR = 5 dB, α = 0.9, γ = 0 dB, and M = 5). Fig. 3.6(a) shows that for
a given PF , PD reduces monotonously when κA varies from 0 to 0.15
2. This reveals
that within the range of κA, aggregate residual hardware impairments can always be
utilized to identify transmitters, and a higher aggregate level of impairments leads to
a lower authentication performance.
Finally, we investigate the authentication performance of the proposed scheme un-
der the unknown parameter case in Fig. 3.6(b) via numerical simulations. Fig. 3.6(b)
demonstrates that PD vs. γ under the unknown parameter case with the settings
(SINR = 10 dB, M = 5). At low γ, PD tends to zero for a given PF . However, at
high γ, PD rises when γ increases for a given PF . This means that when Eve is close
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to Bob, she might be easily detected by Bob; when being away from Bob, she might
impersonate Alice successfully to send possible aggressive message into the network
without being detected. In other words, although Bob has no knowledge of system
parameters (such as RA, RE , α, κA, κE , and κB), she could still identify the current
transmitter by using the LRT given in (3.30) when γ is above a certain value. It
shows that the proposed scheme has a certain scalability in the case when the base
station is “blind” on some systems parameters. We also notice that by setting a
high PF , we can obtain a high PD for the unknown parameter case. Nevertheless, a
high PF implies low robustness of the proposed scheme. Therefore, we should set PF
properly to achieve a desired authentication performance in specific massive MIMO
applications.
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Figure 3.6: Authentication performance with the settings (SINR = 10 dB, M = 5).
3.5 Summary
We proposed a channel-based authentication scheme for massive MIMO systems
with different levels of hardware impairments, and investigated its authentication
behaviors. False alarm and detection probabilities were theoretically analyzed with
hypothesis testing and matrix transformation approaches. Analytical results were
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validated via Monte Carlo simulations, showing that analytical and numerical results
match each other well under different channel covariance matrix models. Our results
show that authentication performance is clearly deteriorated by hardware impair-
ments, with a nontrivial impact from the choice of antenna patterns.
Notice that multiple hardware impairments (such as I/Q imbalance and phase
noise) can be effectively utilized to authenticate transmitters. While in this work,
their effects have been taken into account by using κ-parameters. Nevertheless, con-
sidering a single specific (rather than the aggregated) hardware impairment (e.g., I/Q
imbalance) for authentication is an interesting research topic for our future work to
further explore how these hardware impairments can be used to improve the security
of massive MIMO systems.
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CHAPTER IV
Physical Layer Authentication Jointly Utilizing
Channel and Phase Noise in MIMO Systems
In this chapter, we investigate the channel-based authentication solution which not
only exploits location-specific wireless channels but also utilizes transmitter-specific
hardware impairments for authentication, and propose an improved channel-based
scheme jointly utilizing channel gain and phase noise in heterogeneous MIMO sys-
tems. Three properties of the proposed scheme: covertness, robustness, and security,
are analyzed in detail. By using a maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) and extended
Kalman filter (EKF), we estimate channel gains and phase noise, and formulate vari-
ances of estimation errors. We also quantize the temporal variations of channel gains
and phase noise through the developed quantizers. Based on quantization results and
theories of hypothesis testing and stochastic process, we then derive the closed-form
expressions for false alarm and missed detection probabilities with the consideration
of quantization errors. Simulations are carried out to validate the theoretical re-
sults of the two probabilities. Based on theoretical models, we further demonstrate
that the proposed scheme makes it possible for us to flexibly control authentication
performance by adjusting parameters (such as channel gain threshold, phase noise
threshold, and decision threshold) to achieve a required authentication performance
in specific MIMO applications.
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Figure 4.1: A MIMO system consisting of Alice with Nt antennas, Eve with Nt anten-
nas, and Bob with Nr antennas, which are geographically separated and
in a rich scattering environment. Entities (e.g., Alice and Eve) and/or
scatters are moving.
4.1 System Model
4.1.1 Network Model
Similar to previous works [12–14], we consider a MIMO system consisting of three
different entities: Alice and Eve with Nt antennas and Bob with Nr antennas, which
are geographically widely separated and in a rich scattering environment, as shown in
Fig. 4.1. Alice is a legitimate transmitter and Bob is an intended receiver. While Eve
serves as an active attacker, who not only can overhear all the signals transmitted
from Alice and Bob, but also can inject aggressive signals or replay signals trans-
mitted from Alice into the network, by using the identity of Alice. Frame-by-frame
message transmission is considered. Generally, confidential information such as es-
timation techniques and authentication schemes employed by Bob cannot be easily
obtained by Eve. However, Eve is assumed to know some repeatedly used and pub-
licly known information such as training sequences and pilot symbols [9] due to the
wireless broadcasting nature, as well as frame structure by analyzing the transmitted
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signals from Alice [13]. Eve cannot arrive at Alice’s previous location for the typical
moving speed 1 m/s, and time interval of probing channel is set as 3 ms (please refer
to [12]). All entities in the network operate in the half-duplex mode. Each antenna
is equipped with an independent oscillator.
Suppose that Bob receives two frames at time k− 1 and time k. The one received
at time k − 1 is from Alice, which is validated through a cryptographic authentica-
tion at the application layer [13]. Based on this authentication, Bob measures the
channel gains and phase noise parameters at time k−1. Bob needs to decide whether
the received frame at time k is still from Alice. This chapter focuses on devising
a simple and flexible physical layer authentication scheme to fight against spoofing
attacks (e.g., impersonation and/or replay attacks), where either Alice or Eve trans-
mits a signal to Bob but simultaneous transmission of both is not considered. Carrier
sense multiple access/collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) can be employed to ensure the
operation of transmission scheme [60]. Note that if Alice and Eve transmit signals
simultaneously to Bob, Bob will discard the composite signal because of failing to
decode it [13, 14].
4.1.2 Channel Model
According to the well-known Jakes model [30], the separation of several to tens
of wavelengths for any two entities is required to ensure that the channels between
different transmitter-receiver pairs are spatially decorrelated. While the channels from
the same transmitter-receiver pair are closely correlated. The receive and transmit
antennas are located randomly. Due to the amount of scattering and reflection in the
environment, there are lots of multipath in each of the resolvable angular bins and
there is no direct path between entities [61]. Moreover, antenna separation of any
entity is assumed to be not less than half to one carrier wavelength. Hence, channels
between different antenna pairs experience spatially independent fading, and thus can
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be modeled with mutually independent Rayleigh fading. Throughout this chapter,
indices m = 1, . . . , Nt and n = 1, ..., Nr are used to denote transmit antennas and
receive antennas, respectively.
The distance between the mth transmit antenna at Alice (Eve) to the nth re-
ceive antenna at Bob is denoted as d
[m,n]
A (d
[m,n]
E ). We assume that d
[m,n]
A /c ≪ 1/W
(d
[m,n]
E /c≪ 1/W), where c and W are the speed of light and transmission bandwidth,
respectively. Assume that antenna array sizes are much smaller than the distance be-
tween the transmitter and receiver. We use h
[m,n]
A (k) (h
[m,n]
E (k)) to denote baseband
channel gain from the mth transmit antenna at Alice (Eve) to the nth receive antenna
at Bob at time k. According to [61], baseband channel gain h
[m,n]
A (k) (h
[m,n]
E (k)) can
be expressed by h
[m,n]
X (k) = a
[m,n]
X exp(− j2πfcd
[m,n]
X
c
), where a
[m,n]
X is path attenuation
and fc is carrier frequency, for X = {A,E}. We invoke the central limit theorem
and approximate baseband channel gain h
[m,n]
A (k) (h
[m,n]
E (k)) as a zero-mean com-
plex circular symmetric Gaussian process [61], i.e., h
[m,n]
X (k) ∼ CN (0, σ2 [m,n]hX ). For
large-scale fading channels, σ
2 [m,n]
hX
can be modeled by applying [62, Chapter 2], as
σ
2 [m,n]
hX
= K
(
d0
d
[m,n]
X
)β
ΥX , X = {A,E}, (4.1)
where K is a reference path gain value; d0 is a reference distance for antenna far-field;
β is a path loss exponent; and ΥX is a shadowing factor modeled as a log-normal
random variable.
The channels from the same transmitter-receiver pair are assumed to remain con-
stant over a frame but to vary continuously from one frame to the next. We adopt a
first-order Gauss-Markov process to characterize temporal channel variations [47, 50],
and for instance, h
[m,n]
A (k) can be mathematically expressed as
h
[m,n]
A (k) = αh
[m,n]
A (k − 1) +
√
1− α2u[m,n]A (k), (4.2)
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where α is channel correlation coefficient for Alice-Bob, and u
[m,n]
A (k) ∼ CN (0, σ2 [m,n]hA )
is independent of h
[m,n]
A (k − 1).
4.1.3 Phase Noise Model
Phase noise is generated at both transmitter and receiver sides during the up-
conversion of baseband signal to bandpass and vice versa due to the impairments of
local oscillator [23, 63, 64]. For free-running oscillators, phase noise is time-varying
and can be modeled as a Wiener process. Phase noise remains constant within a
symbol duration but evolves from one symbol to the next. For the frame received by
Bob at time k, let θ
[m]
X (i, k) and θ
[n]
B (i, k) be the i
th sample of phase noise process at
the mth transmit and nth receive antennas, respectively, for i = 1, ..., L. Therefore,
θ
[m]
X (i, k) and θ
[n]
B (i, k) can be expressed by
θ
[m]
X (i, k) = θ
[m]
X (i− 1, k) + ∆[m]X (i, k), (4.3a)
θ
[n]
B (i, k) = θ
[n]
B (i− 1, k) + ∆[n]B (i, k), (4.3b)
where ∆
[m]
X (i, k) is phase noise innovation for the m
th transmit antenna at X (Alice
or Eve) and ∆
[n]
B (i, k) is that of the n
th receive antenna at Bob. Both ∆
[m]
X (i, k)
and ∆
[n]
B (i, k) can be modeled as zero-mean real Gaussian processes, i.e., ∆
[m]
X (i, k) ∼
N (0, σ2
∆
[m]
X
) and ∆
[n]
B (i, k) ∼ N (0, σ2∆[n]B ). Let Ts be the sampling time, we have σ
2
∆
[m]
X
=
2πc
[m]
X Ts and σ
2
∆
[n]
B
= 2πc
[n]
B Ts, where both c
[m]
X and c
[n]
B are constants and represent
the one-sided 3-dB bandwidth of the Lorentzian spectrum of the oscillators at the
mth transmit and nth receive antennas, respectively [23, 63, 64].
According to [23, 63, 65, 66], phase noise innovation variances are closely rele-
vant to physical properties of oscillators, i.e., both σ2
∆
[m]
X
and σ2
∆
[n]
B
are determined by
the quality of the oscillators being used at the transmitter and receiver, respectively.
Therefore, different transmitter-receiver pairs lead to different innovation variances,
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and thus result in different phase noise. This characteristic can be utilized to differ-
entiate between transmitters. σ2
∆
[m]
X
and σ2
∆
[n]
B
are assumed to be known at Bob. This
assumption is reasonable and in line with previous studies on phase noise estimation
in MIMO systems [23].
4.1.4 Communication Model
Message frame might not be transmitted continuously but it is necessary to ensure
the continuity of authentication process by probing channel at time intervals smaller
than channel coherence time [1, 31]. Each frame of length L symbols includes a train-
ing sequence of Lt symbols, data symbols, and Lp pilot symbols that are periodically
inserted in data symbols for tracking phase noise. Mutually orthogonal training se-
quences of length Lt (Lt = jNt, j = 1, 2, · · · ) is simultaneously transmitted by all
transmit antennas to Bob, so that they can be used to jointly estimate channel gains
and phase noise. Training sequences and pilot symbols are known at Bob.
Similar to [23, 67, 68], different transmit-receive antenna pairs are assumed to
have different channel gains and phase noise. Consider that an unknown transmitter
X sends a frame to be authenticated. The signal received by Bob at the nth receive
antenna at time k can be written as
y[n](i, k) =
Nt∑
m=1
h
[m,n]
X (k)e
jθ
[m,n]
XB (i,k)s[m](i, k) + w[n](i, k)
= s
[n]
θ (i, k)h
[n]
X (k) + w
[n](i, k), n = 1, ..., Nr, (4.4)
where
• s[n]θ (i, k) = [s[1](i, k)ejθ
[1,n]
XB
(i,k) · · · s[Nt](i, k)ejθ[Nt,n]XB (i,k)] with s[m](i, k) denoting the
ith sample symbol of the mth transmit antenna at time k, and consists of both
pilots and data symbols; the average power is p = E{s[m](i, k)sH [m](i, k)};
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• θ[m,n]XB (i, k) = θ[m]X (i, k) + θ[n]B (i, k) represents the overall phase noise from the
oscillators corresponding to the mth transmit and nth receive antennas;
• h[n]X (k) = [h[1,n]X (k) · · ·h[Nt,n]X (k)]T ;
• w[n](i, k) is a sequence of independent and identically distributed zero-mean
complex AWGN with variance σ2w at the n
th receive antenna, i.e., w[n](i, k) ∼
CN (0, σ2w). σ2w is readily available at the receiver via the method in [56].
4.2 Proposed Physical Layer Authentication Scheme
The basic principles for the proposed scheme are that wireless channels are location-
specific, and phase noise is transmitter-specific [14, 51, 69]. Therefore, channel gains
and phase noise can be jointly utilized to differentiate between Alice and Eve. The
proposed scheme consists of three processes: channel and phase noise estimation,
channel and phase noise quantization, and decision.
4.2.1 Channel and Phase Noise Estimation
4.2.1.1 Channel Estimation
Similar to [70], we can use maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) to estimate
channel gains. Let θ
[n]
XB(i, k) = [θ
[1,n]
XB (i, k) · · · θ[Nt,n]XB (i, k)]T , for i = 1, ..., Lt. We use
hˆ
[n]
X (k) and θˆ
[n]
XB(i, k) to denote the estimations of h
[n]
X (k) and θ
[n]
XB(i, k), respectively.
Using the mutually orthogonal training sequences of length Lt estimates channel
gains. Then, at the ith iteration, given the phase noise estimation θ
[n]
XB(i, k), hˆ
[n]
X (k)
can be obtained by using MLE as
hˆ
[n]
X (k) = ((s
[n]
θ )
H(i, k)s
[n]
θ (i, k))
−1(s
[n]
θ )
H(i, k)y[n](i, k), i = 1, ..., Lt. (4.5)
To acquire separate estimators, we substitute hˆ
[n]
X (k) into least-squares objective
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to obtain
θˆ
[n]
XB(i, k) = arg max
θ
[n]
XB(i,k)
(y[n])H(i, k)s
[n]
θ (i, k)((s
[n]
θ )
H(i, k)s
[n]
θ (i, k))
−1(s
[n]
θ )
H(i, k)y[n](i, k),
(4.6)
where θˆ
[n]
XB(i, k) = [θˆ
[1,n]
XB (i, k) · · · θˆ[Nt,n]XB (i, k)]T and θˆ[m,n]XB (i, k) is the estimation of
θ
[m,n]
XB (i, k). Based on (4.6), we can acquire separate phase noise, and then substitute
phase noise parameters into (4.5) to get hˆ
[n]
X (k). Note that (4.6) is a multi-dimensional
minimization problem with a high computational complexity. Some other heuristic
methods with a low computational complexity such as majorization-minimization
methods based on dimensionality reduction and regularization [71], have been pro-
posed to jointly estimate channel gains and phase noise. In addition, following a
similar manner in [72] to jointly estimate channel and carrier frequency offset, we can
also obtain the estimations of channel gains and phase noise.
Channel estimation from themth transmit antenna ofX to the nth receive antenna
of Bob at time k, denoted by hˆ
[m,n]
X (k), can be obtained by Bob. In particular, hˆ
[m,n]
X (k)
can be modeled as a sum of h
[m,n]
X (k) and estimation error w
[m,n]
X (k). Based on [56,
Eq.(4.7)], for training sequences of length Lt, we have wh(i, k) ∼ CN (0, σ2w/(pLt)).
Then, they are related by
hˆ
[m,n]
X (k) = h
[m,n]
X (k) + wh(i, k). (4.7)
4.2.1.2 Phase Noise Estimation
After obtaining the estimation of channel, we can track N phase noise parameters
over a frame by using a soft-input extended Kalman filter (EKF) proposed in [68]. We
use φ(i, k) = [θ
[1]
XB
T
(i, k) · · ·θ[Nr ]XB
T
(i, k)]T and M(i, k) to denote the unknown state
vector and error covariance matrix, respectively. Before starting the EKF recursion,
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φ(i, k) and M(i, k) should be initialized as φ(Lt|Lt, k) and M(Lt|Lt, k) using (4.5)
and (4.6), respectively, where Lt corresponds to the last training symbol (please kindly
refer to [68] for details).
Similarly, phase noise estimate is formulated as its actual value and a real Gaussian
noise (i.e., estimation error). For a frame containing Lp pilot symbols, the estimation
of the ith sample for the overall phase noise, denoted by θˆ
[m,n]
XB (i, k), can be given by
θˆ
[m,n]
XB (i, k) = θ
[m,n]
XB (i, k) + w
[m,n]
θ (i, k), i = 1, ..., Lp, (4.8)
where w
[m,n]
θ (i, k) ∼ N(0, σ
2 [m,n]
wθ ) is the estimation error for phase noise.
Now, we need to calculate σ
2 [m,n]
wθ . Let ∆
[m,n]
XB (i, k) denote the total phase noise
innovation corresponding to θ
[m,n]
XB (i, k), and then we have ∆
[m,n]
XB (i, k) = ∆
[m]
X (i, k) +
∆
[n]
B (i, k) and ∆
[m,n]
XB (i, k) ∼ N (0, σ2∆[m,n]XB ), where σ
2
∆
[m,n]
XB
= σ2
∆
[m]
X
+ σ2
∆
[n]
B
. By apply-
ing [73, Eq.(104)], the limit posterior Bayesian Crame´r-Rao bound (BCRB) on the
instantaneous phase noise can be expressed by
BCRB(θˆ) =
σ
2 [m,n]
∆XB
ε[m,n]
(−ε[m,n] +
√
ε2 [m,n] + 4ε[m,n]), (4.9)
where ε[m,n] = ζ [m,n] +
√
ζ2 [m,n] + 8ζ [m,n] and ζ [m,n] =
pσ
2 [m,n]
hX
σ2w
σ
2 [m,n]
∆XB
.
From [73], when increasing the number of recursion for phase noise, the EKF mean-
square error is gradually close to the BCRB. Thus, to comprehensively investigate
the optimum performance of the proposed scheme, we let σ
2 [m,n]
wθ ≈ BCRB(θˆ).
4.2.2 Channel and Phase Noise Quantization
4.2.2.1 Channel Quantization
To quantify temporal channel variations, we use channel gain quantizer [14], which
compares the square of the difference between the current and previous channel gain
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estimations at adjacent time with a channel gain threshold δh. We use Qh and O
[m,n]
h
to denote channel gain quantizer and the [m,n]th output, respectively. Then, channel
gain quantization can be formulated as
O
[m,n]
h , Qh[|hˆ[m,n]X (k)− hˆ[m,n]A (k − 1)|2]
=


1, |hˆ[m,n]X (k)− hˆ[m,n]A (k − 1)|2 > δh,
0, otherwise.
(4.10)
4.2.2.2 Phase Noise Quantization
Based on (4.3a), (4.3b), and (4.8), we have
θˆ
[m,n]
XB (i, k)− θˆ[m,n]XB (i− 1, k) = ∆ˆ[m,n]XB (i, k), (4.11)
where ∆ˆ
[m,n]
XB (i, k) are regarded as the estimation of ∆
[m,n]
XB (i, k), which can be given
by
∆ˆ
[m,n]
XB (i, k) = ∆
[m,n]
XB (i, k) + wθ(i, k)− wθ(i− 1, k). (4.12)
From (4.12), we can see that ∆ˆ
[m,n]
XB (i, k) is a zero-mean real Gaussian random
variable and its variance can be given by
σ2
∆ˆ
[m,n]
XB
= σ2
∆
[m]
X
+ σ2
∆
[n]
B
+ 2σ2wθ , X = {A,E}. (4.13)
To quantify phase noise variations, we just need to quantize phase noise innovation
estimation variations. Phase noise quantizer is developed by comparing the sum of
Lp squares of difference between phase noise innovation estimations of the current
and previous frames with a phase noise threshold δθ. Let Qθ and O
[m,n]
θ denote phase
noise quantizer and the [m,n]th output, respectively. Phase noise quantization can
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be formulated as
O
[m,n]
θ , Qθ
[
Lp∑
i=1
(
∆ˆ
[m,n]
XB (i, k)− ∆ˆ[m,n]AB (i, k − 1)
)2]
=


1,
Lp∑
i=1
(
∆ˆ
[m,n]
XB (i, k)− ∆ˆ[m,n]AB (i, k − 1)
)2
> δθ,
0, otherwise,
(4.14)
where ∆ˆ
[m,n]
AB (i, k − 1) is stored at Bob. Let Dh denote the output sum of channel
gain quantizer and Dθ for phase noise quantizer, i.e., Dı ,
∑Nt
m=1
∑Nr
n=1O
[m,n]
ı , for
ı = {h, θ}. If let N = NtNr, then both Dh and Dθ are non-negative integers between
0 and N .
4.2.3 Decision
Based on the above quantization results in terms of temporal variations for channel
gains and phase noise, a decision criterion can be modeled as a composite hypothesis
test to discriminate the identity of the current transmitter. The decision criterion
can be formulated as
H0 : D = Dh +Dθ ≤ Z,
H1 : D = Dh +Dθ > Z,
(4.15)
where Z is a decision threshold, which is a non-negative integer between 0 and 2N .
The decision criterion enables Bob to decide whether the transmitter is still Alice. In
particular, on H0, the current transmitter is still Alice; on H1, the current transmitter
is Eve.
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4.2.4 Properties of the Proposed Authenticate Scheme
4.2.4.1 Covertness
A transmitted signal for the current frame to be authenticated is considered to be
anomalous if its power spectral density (PSD) is different from that of normal signal.
For the proposed scheme, on one hand, the frame does not contain any special signals
such as the proof of authentication (namely tag) [47]. Thus, Eve cannot discover
authentication process by analyzing the PSD of the signal transmitted by Alice, since
this PSD is normal. On the other hand, signal propagation in wireless channels
is generally affected by multiplicative fading of channel and additive background
noise. Channel fading is not be dependable for asserting the transmitted signal as
anomalous. Nevertheless, one could judge the transmitted signal as anomalous, due
to the abnormal distribution of background noise. Since our proposed scheme does
not affect background noise, the distribution information of background noise is also
normal. Therefore, the proposed scheme jointly using wireless channel and hardware
features for authentication is covert to adversaries due to the absence of abnormal
PSD and background noise in the whole authentication process.
4.2.4.2 Robustness
The authentication scheme is regarded to be robust if it can resist channel fading,
the random locations of entities, and background noise effects without sacrificing
performance when many frames from the same transmitter are authenticated together
(instead of each frame separately). In particular, the proposed scheme can be resistant
to channel fading by using some physical layer techniques, e.g., antenna diversity. This
scheme is reasonably robust to the large-scale fading and random locations of entities
effects (detailed in Section 4.4.4). When an unknown transmitter (Alice or Eve) sends
a frame cluster consisting of many frames to be authenticated to Bob within the
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channel coherence time, Bob can authenticate them without sacrificing performance
in low mobility scenarios, by adjusting three thresholds (for channel amplitude, phase
noise, and decision, respectively). In particular, the number of frames received allows
Bob to know phase noise increment variances based on (4.11), and the arrival time of
the last frame enables Bob to calculate the temporal correlation channel coefficient
[47]. As a result, Bob can independently adjust the three thresholds to authenticate
a frame cluster from the same transmitter.
4.2.4.3 Security
When Eve is close to Alice, she still fails to impersonate Alice for injecting aggres-
sive signals into the network. This is because phase noise solely relies on oscillator
properties of transmitter-receiver pair. When Eve is far away from Alice, she cannot
succeed in replaying the received signals. The reason is that each transmitter dis-
torts signals in its own way. In summary, the proposed authentication scheme is an
effective solution to resist against impersonation and replay attacks.
4.2.5 Analysis of Communication Overhead and Computational Com-
plexity
Notice that the proposed scheme is based on both channel gains and Wiener phase
noise. Compared with the existing methods that only rely on channel gains (e.g.,
the one in [12]), our proposed scheme has higher communication and computational
overheads. This is because tracking phase noise needs more pilot symbols and thus
requires a larger bandwidth and latency, and also the tracking phase noise based on
the EKF algorithm involves extra addition and multiplication operations and thus
causes an increase in computational complexity. If we use CCM and CADD to denote
the number of complex multiplications and the number of additions in the EKF
algorithm, then the computational complexity C of the EKF algorithm required to
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update phase noise parameters is determined as C = CCM + CADD [23]. Here, CCM
and CADD are given by
CCM = NtNr(3NtN
2
r + 4) +N
2
r [Nr(2(1 +N
2
t ) + 1) +Nt], (4.16)
CADD = (NtNr)
2(NtNr + 1) +NtN
3
r (3Nt + 2)−NtNr(3Nr + 1) +Nr. (4.17)
Since smart devices in heterogeneous coexistence MIMO systems (e.g., 5G networks)
have powerful communication and computational capabilities, such additional com-
munication and computational overheads in our proposed scheme are in general ac-
ceptable for engineering practices.
4.3 Modeling of FA and MD Probabilities
In this section, we first derive some basic results regarding the probabilities that
the output of each quantizer under two hypotheses is 1, and then use the results to
analytically model PF and PM . For simplicity, we use P
H
ı to denote the probability
that Qı outputs 1 on H, for ı = {h, θ} and  = {0, 1}.
It is notable that there always exist quantization errors due to the presence of
thermal noise and/or interference. In order to exactly model false alarm and missed
detection probabilities, it is necessary to take the inevitable quantization errors re-
sulting from the two quantizers into account. When an error occurs, regarding of
channel and/or phase noise quantization, a 1 is wrongly quantified as a 0, and vice
versa. Suppose such errors are equally probable. For concreteness, the probability
that a temporal channel variation (resp. temporal phase noise variation) is quantified
with error is denoted by Peh (resp. Peθ); hence, the temporal channel variation (resp.
phase noise variation) is quantified without error is denoted by 1-Peh (resp. 1-Peθ).
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4.3.1 False Alarm Probability
The following lemmas are dedicated to present PH0h and P
H0
θ .
Lemma 6 For a given δh, P
H0
h can be evaluated as
PH0h = Peh + (1− 2Peh) exp
(
− δh
2(1− α)σ2 [m,n]hA + 2σ2w/(pLt)
)
. (4.18)
Proof 7 On H0, the current transmitter is still Alice, that is, X = A. Let Λh
[m,n]
A,A =
hˆ
[m,n]
A (k)− hˆ[m,n]A (k − 1), so
Λh
[m,n]
A,A = hˆ
[m,n]
A (k)− hˆ[m,n]A (k − 1)
= (α− 1)h[m,n]A (k − 1) +
√
1− α2u[m,n]A (k) + wh(k)− wh(k − 1). (4.19)
From (4.19), one can see that Λh
[m,n]
A,A is a zero-mean circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian random variable with variance 2(1 − α)σ2 [m,n]hA + 2σ2w/(pLt), since all
h
[m,n]
A (k−1), u[m,n]A (k), wh(k−1), and wh(k) are zero-mean circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian random variables and statistically independent of each other. Hence,
|Λh[m,n]A,A |2 follows exponential distribution and its cumulative distribution function
(CDF) can be written as
F
|Λh
[m,n]
A,A
|2
(x) = 1− exp
(
− x
2(1− α)σ2 [m,n]hA + 2σ2w/(pLt)
)
. (4.20)
According to (4.10), PH0h can be evaluated as
PH0h , Pr(O
[m,n]
h = 1 | H0)
= Pr(O
[m,n]
h = 1, |Λh[m,n]A,A |2 > δh | H0) +Pr(O[m,n]h = 1, |Λh[m,n]A,A |2 ≤ δh | H0)
= (1−Pr(|Λh[m,n]A,A |2 ≤ δh))(1− Peh) +Pr(|Λh[m,n]A,A |2 ≤ δh)Peh. (4.21)
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Substituting (4.20) into (4.21), we can obtain (4.18).
Lemma 7 For a given δθ, P
H0
θ can be evaluated as
PH0θ = Peθ + (1− 2Peθ)Γχ2Lp

 δθ
2(σ2
∆
[m]
A
+ σ2
∆
[n]
B
+ 2σ2wθ)

 , (4.22)
where Γχ2Lp
(·) denotes the right-tail probability function for a χ2Lp random variable
with Lp degrees of freedom, which can be expressed as (please refer to [56] details)
Γχ2Lp
(x) =


2Ψ(
√
x), Lp = 1, (4.23a)
exp(−1
2
)
Lp
2
−1∑
j=0
x
2
j!
, Lp = 2, 4, · · · (4.23b)
2Ψ(
√
x) +
exp(−1
2
x)√
π
Lp−1
2∑
j=1
(k − 1)!(2x)j− 12
(2j − 1)! , Lp = 3, 5, · · · (4.23c)
where Ψ(·) denotes the right-tail probability function of Gaussian distribution in en-
gineering texts.
Proof 8 Let Λθ
[m,n]
A,A =
Lp∑
i=1
(
∆ˆ
[m,n]
AB (i, k)− ∆ˆ[m,n]AB (i, k − 1)
)2
. Since (∆ˆ
[m,n]
AB (i, k)−∆ˆ[m,n]AB (i, k−
1)) is real zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance 2σ2
∆ˆ
[m,n]
AB
, Λθ
[m,n]
A,A /2σ
2
∆ˆ
[m,n]
AB
follows central chi-square distribution with Lp degrees of freedom, i.e., Λθ
[m,n]
A,A ∼ χ
2
Lp
.
For a given δθ, P
H0
θ can be evaluated as
PH0θ , Pr(O
[m,n]
θ = 1,Λθ
[m,n]
A,A > δθ | H0) +Pr(O[m,n]θ = 1,Λθ[m,n]A,A ≤ δθ | H0)
= (1−Pr(Λθ[m,n]A,A ≤ δθ))(1− Peθ) +Pr(Λθ[m,n]A,A ≤ δθ)Peθ . (4.24)
Combining (4.23) and (4.24), we can obtain (4.22).
We now present the following lemma regarding the probability that D defined in
(5.19) equals to a fixed integer value. It is of great importance for the modeling of
PF and PM .
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Pr(D = z) =


z∑
z1=0
(
N
z1
)(
N
z−z1
)
(PH0h )
z1(1− PH0h )N−z1(PH0θ )z−z1(1− PH0θ )N−z+z1,
z ∈ [0, N ], (4.25a)
N∑
z1=z−N
(
N
z−z1
)(
N
z1
)
(PH0h )
(z−z1)(1− PH0h )N−z+z1(PH0θ )z1(1− PH0θ )N−z1,
z ∈ (N, 2N ]. (4.25b)
Lemma 8 On H0, the probability that D = Dh + Dθ equals a fixed integer value
z ∈ [0, 2N ] can be given in (4.25), where Dh, Dθ ∈ [0, N ].
Proof 9 The proof of Lemma 8 is straightforward, and please refer to [14, Appendix].
Based on lemmas 7 and 8, we can establish the following theorem on PF .
Theorem IV.1 PF for the proposed physical layer authentication scheme jointly uti-
lizing the characteristics of location-specific channel gains and transmitter-specific
phase noise in MIMO systems, can be determined as (4.27).
Proof 10 Based on (4.15), PF can be written as
PF = Pr(D > Z|H0) = Pr(D = Z + 1, Z + 2, · · · , 2N |H0) =
2N∑
z=Z+1
Pr(D = z|H0)
=
N∑
z=Z+1
Pr(D = z|H0) +
2N∑
z=N+1
Pr(D = z|H0). (4.26)
According to (4.25), PF can be modeled by considering two cases: when Z ∈ [0, N ],
substituting (4.25a) into (4.26) yields (4.27a); when Z ∈ (N, 2N ], substituting (4.25b)
into (4.26) yields (4.27b).
If the proposed scheme utilizes channel gains or phase noise separately to discrim-
inate transmitters, we can get the following corollary regarding PF .
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PF =


N∑
z=Z+1
z∑
z1=0
(
N
z1
)
(PH0h )
z1(1− PH0h )N−z1
(
N+1
z−z1
)
(PH0θ )
z−z1(1− PH0θ )N−z+z1
+
2N∑
z=N
N∑
z1=z−N
(
N
z−z1
)(
N
z1
)
(PH0h )
z−z1(1− PH0h )N−z+z1(PH0θ )z1(1− PH0θ )N−z1,
Z ∈ [0, N ], (4.27a)
2N∑
z=Z+1
N∑
z1=z−N
(
N
z−z1
)(
N
z1
)
(PH0h )
z−z1(1− PH0h )N−z+z1(PH0θ )z1(1− PH0θ )N−z1 ,
Z ∈ (N, 2N ]. (4.27b)
Corollary 1 PF for the proposed scheme separately utilizing channel gains or phase
noise, can be evaluated as
PF =
N∑
z=Z+1
(
N
z
)
(PH0ı )
z(1− PH0ı )N−z, ı = {h, θ}. (4.28)
Proof 11 When only using channel gains, we have D = Dh ∈ [0, N ] on H0. Based
on (4.15) and (4.18), PF is determined as
PF = Pr(D > Z|H0) =
N∑
z=Z+1
(
N
z
)
(PH0h )
z(1− PH0h )N−z. (4.29)
When only using phase noise, we have D = Dh ∈ [0, N ] on H0. Based on (4.15) and
(4.22), PF is determined as
PF = Pr(D > Z|H0) =
N∑
z=Z+1
(
N
z
)
(PH0θ )
z(1− PH0θ )N−z. (4.30)
Hence, (4.29) and (4.30) can be summarized as (4.28).
4.3.2 Missed Detection Probability
Similarly, to model PM , we need to explore exact expressions for P
H1
θ and P
H1
h .
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PM =


Z∑
z=0
z∑
z1=0
(
N
z1
)(
N
z−z1
)
(PH1h )
z1(1− PH1h )N−z1(PH1θ )z−z1(1− PH1θ )N−z+z1, Z ∈ [0, N ],
(4.33a)
N∑
z=0
z∑
z1=0
(
N
z1
)(
N
z−z1
)
(PH1h )
z1(1− PH1h )N−z1(PH1θ )z−z1(1− PH1θ )N−z+z1
+
Z−1∑
z=N+1
N∑
z1=z−N
(
N
z−z1
)(
N
z1
)
(PH1h )
z−z1(1− PH1h )N−z+z1(PH1θ )z1(1− PH1θ )N−z1,
Z ∈ (N, 2N ]. (4.33b)
Lemma 9 For a given δh, P
H1
h can be evaluated as
PH1h = Peh + (1− 2Peh) exp
(
− δh
σ
2 [m,n]
hA
+ σ
2 [m,n]
hE
+ 2σ2w/(pLt)
)
, (4.31)
Proof 12 Following a similar proof as that of (4.22) yields (4.31), we omit it here.
Lemma 10 For a given phase noise threshold δθ, P
H1
θ can be evaluated as
PH1θ = Peθ + (1− 2Peθ)Γχ2Lp

 δθ
σ2
∆
[m]
A
+ σ2
∆
[m]
E
+ 2σ2
∆
[n]
B
+ 4σ2wθ

 . (4.32)
Proof 13 Following a similar proof as that of Lemma 7 yields (4.32), so we omit it
here.
Based on Lemma 8, 9, and 10, PM can given by Theorem IV.2.
Theorem IV.2 PM for the proposed scheme can be evaluated as (4.33).
Proof 14 According to (4.15), PM can be written as
PM = Pr(D ≤ Z|H1) =
N∑
z=0
Pr(D = z|H1) +
Z∑
z=N+1
Pr(D = z|H1). (4.34)
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Similarly, using PH1h and P
H1
θ to replace P
H0
h and P
H0
θ in (4.25), respectively, we
can obtain PM for two cases.
We also give the following corollary regarding PM .
Corollary 2 PM for the proposed scheme utilizing channel gains or phase noise, can
be evaluated as
PM = 1−
N∑
z=Z+1
(
N
z
)
(PH1ı )
z(1− PH1ı )N−z, ı = {h, θ}. (4.35)
Proof 15 When only using channel gains, we have D = Dh ∈ [0, N ] on H1. Based
on (4.15) and (4.31), PM is determined as
PM = Pr(D ≤ Z|H1) = 1−Pr(D > Z|H1) = 1−
N∑
z=Z+1
(
N
z
)
(PH1h )
z(1− PH1h )N−z.
(4.36)
When only using phase noise, we have D = Dθ ∈ [0, N ] on H1. Based on (4.15) and
(4.32), PM is determined as
PM = Pr(D ≤ Z|H1) = 1−Pr(D > Z|H1) = 1−
N∑
z=Z+1
(
N
z
)
(PH1θ )
z(1− PH1θ )N−z.
(4.37)
Similarly, (4.36) and (4.37) can be summarized as (4.35).
4.4 Simulation Results
4.4.1 System Parameters and Simulation Settings
To comprehensively investigate the impact of channel fading on authentication
performance, we consider small-scale fading due to mobility (e.g., scatters moving) as
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well as large-scale fading due to path loss and shadow fading as a function of distance
[62]. In the former, the effect of Doppler shift associated with moving entities or
scatters is considered. Each α corresponds to a normalized Doppler frequency value
representing a channel status. In the latter, the effect of path loss as a function of
distance is investigated. Since the distance between transmitter and receiver is much
larger than antenna separation, we get the approximation d
[1,1]
X ≈ · · · ≈ d[Nt,Nr]X = dX .
From (4.1), we have σ
2 [m,n]
hX
≈ · · · ≈ σ2 [Nt,Nr]hX = σ2hX and let κh =
σ2hE
σ2
hA
denote
the ratio of the locally average channel gains for Alice and Eve. To investigate the
impact of the location of Eve on the performance, we fix the location of Alice by
setting σ2hA = 1 and adjust σ
2
hE
to achieve a specified κh. To analyze the spatially-
averaged performance under the large-scale fading, we assume that both Alice and
Eve are randomly deployed at arbitrary positions in a circular area centered on Bob
for outdoor, and there is no shadow fading in that area. By using (4.1), κh by dB value
without shadow fading can be written as κh = 10β log
(
dA
dE
)
. Hence, κh completely
depends on the ratio of dA and dE. According to [12], the probability density function
of κh by dB value is a double-sided exponential given by
fκh(x) =
ln(10)
10β
10
−|x|
5β . (4.38)
Wiener phase noise is generated for each entity with the following assumption
σ2
∆
[1]
A
= · · · = σ2
∆
[Nt]
A
= σ2∆A, σ
2
∆
[1]
B
= · · · = σ2
∆
[Nr]
B
= σ2∆B , and σ
2
∆
[1]
E
= · · · = σ2
∆
[Nt]
E
=
σ2∆E . Moreover, we set σ
2
∆A
= σ2∆B = 10
−4 rad2, and then a specified κ∆ can be ob-
tained by adjusting parameter σ2∆E ∈ {10−3, 10−4, 10−5} rad2 [64]. We consider two
frames of 300 symbols. The first frame originated from Alice is authenticated by Bob,
and 500 µs later, the second one is received. If the second one still originates from
Alice, we generate time-varying MIMO channel matrix spanning two frames with
specified parameters in each run. If it originates from Eve, we generate mutually
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(a) Theoretical and simulated performance.
0 2 4 6 8 10
SNR [dB]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P F
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
P M
Case 1, PF
Scheme in [11], PF
Case 1, PM
Scheme in [11], PM
(b) Performance comparison
Figure 4.2: (PF , PM) vs. SNR with the settings (Z = 3, κh = κ∆ = 0 dB, δh = 0.5,
δθ = 0.0815, Lt = 3, Lp = 6, α = ρ = 0.9, Peh = Peθ = 0).
independent channel matrices instead. Let SNR=
pσ2hA
σ2w
be signal-to-noise ratio.We set
Nt = 3 and Nr = 2. Due to the assumption of spatially independent fading chan-
nels, we can use the simple mutually orthogonal training sequences, e.g., [
√
p 0 0]T ,
[0
√
p 0]T , and [0 0
√
p]T [23]. To evaluate the average authentication performance,
we carry out 105 independent Monte-Carlo trials.
4.4.2 Model Validation and Authentication Performance Comparison
Extensive simulations have been conducted to verify theoretical results in terms of
PF and PM . For the fixed setting of (Z = 3, κh = κ∆ = 0 dB, δh = 0.5, δθ = 0.0815,
Lt = 3, Lp = 6, α = 0.9, Peh = Peθ = 0), we provide plots of the theoretical and
simulated performance for the proposed scheme in Fig. 4.2(a), and we consider three
cases (case 1: jointly utilizing channel gains and phase noise; case 2: only utilizing
phase noise; and case 3: only utilizing channel gains). As shown in Fig. 4.2(a),
simulation results agree well with the theoretical ones for three cases. This indicates
that our theoretical models is highly accurate in depicting PF and PM for the proposed
authentication scheme in MIMO systems.
As observed from Fig. 4.2(a) that when SNR increases, PF decreases and PM rises.
In the whole SNR region, the proposed scheme under case 1 achieves the lowest PM
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and the highest PF . The scheme under case 2 has the highest PM and a lower PF than
that under case 1. This is because phase noise increment variance is always small,
and minor changes of phase noise are difficult to detect. At low SNR, the proposed
scheme under case 3 has the lowest PF . At high SNR, this scheme has almost the
same PF (which approaches 0) under all three cases. The proposed scheme under case
1 can decrease PM by 9% over that under case 3 and 85% under case 2. It indicates
that the proposed scheme can reap performance benefits by utilizing channel gains
and phase noise for high SNR. In addition, the above results imply that there exists
a trade-off between reliability and security in terms of PF and PM .
According to [74], multipath delay is generally at the microsecond level and time
interval [14] and phase noise increment are assumed to have identical variances. In
comparison with [14], we derive variances of practical estimation errors in terms of
channel gains and phase noise. Since the dimension of phase noise is more than that
of the time interval by 1, PM in our proposed scheme is smaller than that in [14].
To fairly compare our proposed scheme with that in [14], the number of multipath
channels is set to 6 and thus that of time interval for multipath delays is 5. Assume
there is an error-free quantization for each quantizer. If we use τ
[i]
A (resp. τ
[i]
E ) (i =
1, 2, ..., 5) to denote the ith time interval for Alice (resp. Eve), then τ
[i]
A (resp. τ
[i]
E ) is
exponentially distributed random variable with parameter λ = 1
σ2
τA
(resp. λ = 1
σ2
τE
)
(please refer to [14] for details). Let κτ =
σ2
τE
σ2
τA
be the ratio of average time interval for
Alice and Eve, and ρ be correlation coefficient of time interval. Fig. 4.2(b) illustrates
the performance comparison between our proposed scheme under case 1 and that in
[14], given that Z = 3, κh = κ∆ = κτ = 0 dB, δh = 0.5, δθ = δτ = 0.0815, Lt = 3,
Lp = 6, α = ρ = 0.9, and Peh = Peθ = 0. Specifically, the former significantly
outperforms the latter in terms of PM in the whole SNR region, and both works
exhibit the same PF (which approaches 0) in a relatively high SNR regime. This
is because increasing SNR can improve estimation accuracies for channel gains and
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phase noise, and thus reduce PF . As compared with [14], the proposed scheme under
case 1 has benefited immensely from a relatively high SNR regime.
It is notable, however, that the power level of wireless networks is generally re-
quired to be below a certain level because of energy constraint and interference among
simultaneous transmissions. Therefore, it is necessary to find the optimal setting of
parameters (e.g., Z, δh, and δθ) to achieve a desired authentication performance (PF ,
PM) constraint under a given power limitation.
4.4.3 Control of PF and PM
With the help of our theoretical results for PF and PM , we explore in Fig. 4.3
how the proposed scheme under case 1 enables performance (PF , PM) to be flexibly
controlled by thresholds (i.e, Z, δh, and δθ) in a large region. We first summarize in
Fig. 4.3(a) that under different SNR scenarios, how (PF , PM) varies with Z, given
that κh = κ∆ = 0 dB, Lt = 3, Lp = 6, α = 0.9, and Peh = Peθ = 0. For a particular
SNR, as Z increases, PF declines monotonously and even approaches 0, while PM
increases monotonously and then approaches 1, i.e., a larger Z leads to a lower PF
and higher PM . We can also see from Fig. 4.3(a) that for a fixed Z, when SNR
increases, PF decreases while PM increases. To ensure secure communications, both
PF and PM are commonly required to be below 0.1 [12, 31]. Therefore, for a given
Z and SNR (i.e., Z = 3 and SNR = 8 dB), we need to examine how to adjust other
thresholds (e.g., δh and δθ) to achieve the required constraints (e.g., PF , PM < 0.1).
Fig. 4.3(b) and Fig. 4.3(c) demonstrate how PF and PM vary with parameters (δh,
δθ), respectively. As observed in Fig. 4.3(b) (resp. Fig. 4.3(c)) that for a specified
constraint pf of PF (resp. pm of PM), we can accordingly set a specified constraint
plane intersecting with z-axis orthogonally at the point (1, 0.1, pf) (resp. (1, 0.07,
pm)), and then can determine a set of (δh, δθ)-pairs corresponding to the surface
below the defined constraint plane. Finding the intersection of these two sets of (δh,
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Figure 4.3: (PF , PM) vs. (Z, δh, δθ) with the settings (κh = κ∆ = 0 dB, Lt = 3,
Lp = 6, α = 0.9, Peh = Peθ = 0).
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δθ)-pairs yields the region of (δh, δθ)-pairs to achieve pf and pm. E.g., for δh ∈ [0, 1]
and δθ ∈ [0.005, 0.08], one can easily see from Fig. 4.3(b) and Fig. 4.3(c) that the
constraint PF ≤ 0.1 can be achieved in the region of (δh ∈ [0, 1], δθ ∈ [0.005, 0.08]),
while constraint PM ≤ 0.1 is achieved in the region of (δh ∈ [0, 2], δθ ∈ [0.005, 0.015]).
Thus, the requirement of (PF , PM ≤ 0.1) for the concerned network scenario is
achieved under δh ∈ [0, 1] and δθ ∈ [0.005, 0.08]. From Fig. 4.3, we can find that the
proposed authentication scheme under case 1 is flexible and general. (PF , PM) can
be flexibly controlled by adjusting decision threshold Z, channel gain threshold δh,
and phase noise threshold δθ. In addition, a trade-off between reliability and security
can be achieved by an appropriate setting of (Z, δh, δθ). Based on this background,
we need to further explore authentication efficiency of the proposed scheme.
4.4.4 Authentication Efficiency Analysis
To present authentication efficiency, we now study the authentication performance
of the proposed scheme under case 1 for various network scenarios (κh, κ∆ Lt, Lp,
α, Peh(Peθ)) in Fig. 4.4. Fig. 4.4(a) shows how the location of Eve under small-scale
variations of channels, characterized by κh, can impact (PF , PM) with the settings
(κ∆ = 0 dB, Z = 3, δh = 0.5, δθ = 0.0615, Lt = 3, Lp = 10, α = 0.9, Peh = Peθ = 0).
As observed from Fig. 4.4(a) that for a given κh, PF is not affected by κh and PM
decreases when κh increases. At low SNR, different κh yield nearly indistinguishable
PM . At high SNR, κh has a significant impact on PM , especially when κh < 0 dB, PM
will exceed 0.1. This indicates that for a fixed location of Alice, Eve might search a
“good” location in which she has a high probability to impersonate Alice successfully.
Now, we analyze the spatially-averaged performance under a distance dependent
large-scale fading, i.e., κh is a random variable over all possible joint locations of Alice
and Eve. SNR for both Alice and Eve can be maintained the same by using power
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Figure 4.4: (PF , PM) vs. SNR with the settings (Z = 3, δh = 0.5, δθ = 0.0615, Lt = 3,
Lp = 10, α = 0.9, Peh = Peθ = 0).
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control. Combining (5.30) and (4.38), we can obtain a new PH1h and then substitute
it into (5.32) to acquire PM under any κh through the complex integration in Matlab.
Fig. 4.4(b) illustrates how path loss exponent, β covering a wide practical range can
impact (PF , PM). As illustrated in Fig. 4.4(b), PF is irrelevant to β, and PM slightly
rises (a small range: 0-0.02) at low SNR as β increases. While at high SNR, PM
is not affected by β. This shows that the proposed scheme is reasonably robust to
large-scale fading and random location of Eve.
Fig. 4.4(c) shows how κ∆ can impact (PF , PM) with the settings (κh = 0 dB,
Z = 3, δh = 0.5, δθ = 0.0615, Lt = 3, Lp = 10, α = 0.9, Peh = Peθ = 0). As shown in
Fig. 4.4(c), for a given SNR, PF remains unchanged and PM rises when κ∆ increases.
This indicates that using a high-quality hardware has a low phase noise increment
variance, and thus identifying phase noise faces a large challenge. Although Eve can
choose a “good” position and/or a higher-quality hardware, the proposed scheme
under case 1 can effectively resist against impersonation and/or replay attacks by
setting parameters (e.g., Z, δh, and δθ) properly.
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Figure 4.5: Impact of (Lt, Lp) on (PF , PM) with the settings (Z = 3, κh = κ∆ = 0
dB, δh = 0.5, δθ = 0.0615, α = 0.9, Peh = Peθ = 0).
Fig. 4.5 shows that how Lt and Lp can impact (PF , PM) with the settings (Z = 3,
κh = κ∆ = 0 dB, δh = 0.5, δθ = 0.0615, α = 0.9, Peh = Peθ = 0). For a given SNR,
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Figure 4.6: (PF , PM) vs. (α, Peh, Peθ) with the settings (Z = 3, κh = κ∆ = 0 dB,
δh = 0.5, δθ = 0.0615, Lt = 3, Lp = 6).
as Lt (resp. Lp) increases, PF increases and PM decreases. Lp has a more significant
impact on (PF , PM) by comparing Fig. 4.5(a) and Fig. 4.5(b). The reason is that for
a larger Lt and Lp, Bob can estimate channel gains and phase noise more accurately,
and thus improve (PF , PM). It reveals that our proposed scheme is more sensitive
to the length of pilot symbols. Under a specified constraint of PF and Lt we need
to properly set Lp so that the proposed scheme can be efficient to achieve secure
communications in MIMO systems.
Herein, we use channel correction coefficient α to characterize temporal channel
variations when the last one of continuous multiframes arrives at Bob. Bob just needs
to estimate the channel gain and phase noise corresponding to the last frame. Fig. 4.6
demonstrates that (PF , PM) vs. (α, Peh, Peθ) with the settings (Z = 3, κh = κ∆ = 0
dB, δh = 0.5, δθ = 0.0615, Lt = 3, Lp = 6). Fig. 4.6(a) illustrates that how α
can impact (PF , PM). As shown in Fig. 4.6(a), for a given SNR, when α rises PF
monotonically decreases and even approaches 0 when α → 1 while PM maintains
unchanged. This indicates that excessive false alarm events may happen in a higher
mobile scenario and fewer false alarm events may occur in a low mobility scenario.
In other words, the proposed scheme enables Bob to authenticate many frames from
the same transmitter without sacrificing authentication performance in low mobility
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scenarios, because PF → 0 as α approaches 1 and PM maintains unchanged in a
relatively stable environment.
Finally, we examine in Fig. 4.6(b) how (PF , PM) varies with quantization error
probabilities, Peh and Peθ . For simplicity, we assume that Peh = Peθ . As illustrated
in Fig. 4.6(b), for a given SNR, decreasing Peh (Peθ) leads to different declines in the
shape of PF and PM , and PF is more sensitive to Peh (Peθ) than PM . For a given
Peh (Peθ), increasing SNRs can contribute to achieving a low PF but incurring a high
PM . Generally, quantization error is closely related to SNR. In order to control Peh
(Peθ) at a low level, it is necessary to improve SNR. However, a high SNR may cause
a large PM . Therefore, we need to adjust system parameters (e.g., SNR) accordingly
to achieve a desired authentication performance.
4.5 Summary
Distinguished from [14] focusing on wireless channel feature (e.g., channel impulse
response in the dimensions of amplitude and path delay), this chapter attempted to
jointly take both wireless channel and hardware features into account for authenti-
cation. To this end, we proposed a new physical layer authentication scheme jointly
utilizing channel gains and phase noise in heterogeneous MIMO systems. We also
determined variances of estimation errors in terms of channel gains and phase noise,
and then derived closed-form expressions for false alarm and missed detection proba-
bilities while taking quantization errors into account. We further demonstrated that
the proposed scheme enables flexible performance control by adjusting thresholds (for
channel gain, phase noise, and decision, respectively). This indicates that the pro-
posed scheme has the capability of satisfying different performance requirements for
future emerging heterogeneous MIMO systems. The results in this chapter enable
us to find the graceful tradeoff between reliability and security requirements, and we
expect the methodology developed in this chapter to be valuable for devising new
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physical layer authentication schemes in other types of networks.
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CHAPTER V
End-to-End Physical Layer Authentication for
Dual-Hop Wireless Networks
End-to-end (E2E) physical layer authentication for multi-hop wireless networks
is still not well-explored by now. As one step forward in this direction, this chapter
focuses on the E2E physical layer authentication in a dual-hop wireless network with
an untrusted relay and proposes a corresponding physical layer authentication scheme.
The scheme fully utilizes the location-specific features of both channel gain and delay
interval of cascaded channels, and also adopts the artificial jamming technique, so that
it is not only resistant to the impersonate attack from an unauthorized transmitter
but also resilient to the replay attack from the untrusted relay. Theoretical analysis
is further conducted to derive the expressions for the probabilities of false alarm
and missed detection, which serves as two fundamental metrics of authentication
performance. Finally, numerical and simulation results are provided to illustrate both
the efficiency of these theoretical results and the E2E authentication performance of
dual-hop wireless networks under the proposed scheme.
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Figure 5.1: System model. The transmitter Alice (A) communicates with the receiver
Bob (B) with the help of an AF untrusted relay (R), and Eve (E) serves
as the adversary who impersonates A. The transmissions between A (E)
and R, R and B experience different multipath effects.
5.1 System Model
5.1.1 Network Model
As depicted in Fig. 5.1, we consider a dual-hop wireless network scenario consist-
ing of four entities: one legitimate transmitter Alice (A), one untrusted relay (R)
adopting the amplify-and-forward (AF) strategy, one intended receiver Bob (B) and
one adversary Eve (E). Each entity is equipped with an omnidirectional antenna
and operates in half-duplex mode. These entities are spatially located at separated
positions in a rich-scattering environment (e.g., urban areas). We assume that the
spatial separation between any two entities is more than a distance of half a wave-
length, making fading paths independent of each other according to the well-known
Jakes uniform scattering model [30]. This is widely adopted in [12, 14, 31, 51] and
reasonable because if two entities are spaced within a distance of half a wavelength,
they will fail to work due to mutual strong interference.
The direct link between A (E) and B suffers from the deep fading so that they
can only communicate with the help of R. R can record all the received signals and
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then initiate replay attacks with the aggressive signals, that is, R serves as a potential
adversary. The adversary E monitors the network and attempts to inject aggressive
signals into the network in the hope of impersonating A. B not only can receive
signals but also can transmit signals (e.g., jamming signals) to R. We assume that
adversaries have the knowledge of the modulation method employed in the network,
the channel estimation technique employed by B and authentication scheme adopted
in the network [2, 31]. Similar to that of previous studies [12, 31], we further assume
that E cannot arrive at A’s previous location before a new signal arrives at B.
Suppose that B receives two messages (i.e., frames) at times k − 1 and k (time
interval is much less than the channels coherence time). The first one is validated by B
from Alice using a standard higher-layer protocol [75]. Based on this authentication,
B measures and stores CA and DI at time k − 1. The objective of authentication
at B is that utilizing multipath channel estimation for R-B and A-R-B in terms
of gain and delay based on previous message originated from A, he needs to decide
whether the second message received at time k is still from A. The message to be
authenticated is not required to transmit continuously but it is necessary to ensure
the continuity of the authentication process by probing the channel at time intervals
smaller than the channels coherence time [1, 12, 14, 31, 33].
We assume that the channels are reciprocal and remain correlated within the
total processing time, which mainly includes propagation delay, transmitting time
and operation (e.g., AF operation) delay at each entity. This is due to the fact that
the total processing time is much less than channel coherent time TC , For example,
for a typical f = 2.4 GHz radio frequency carrier, relative motion speed v = 2 m/s,
TC can be calculated as TC =
9c
16πvf
=11.2 ms (c is light speed). The propagation
delay might be 30 µ s for a rich scattering environment (will be at least 10 µs) if the
distance is 3 km. Transmitting time is 0.5 µs for a frame consisting of 20 symbols
when the symbol sampling rate is 40 MHz. In general, the operation delay has the
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same order of transmitting time.
5.1.2 Channel Model
Since all entities are in a rich scattering and reflecting environment, channel im-
pulse response of each hop in the concerned dual-hop network is modeled as a sum
of paths with time-varying CA and propagation delay caused by the changes in the
propagation environment (e.g., relative motion between entities and/or movement of
scatterers/reflectors). Considering Nij multipath channels between two entities i and
j, channel impulse response measured at time k under the delay spread index denoted
by d can be expressed by
hij(k, d) =
Nij∑
nij=1
hnij (k)δ(k − dnij(k)), nij = 1, ..., Nij. (5.1)
where hnij (k) and dnij(k) (d1ij (k) < d2ij (k) < · · · < dNij (k)) are the time-varying CA
and propagation delay associated with the nij
th multipath component, respectively,
and δ(·) is the Dirac pulse function. Subscript ij can be AR, ER or RB. Hence,
the CA and propagation delay of the nAR
th, nRB
th and nER
th multipath components
for A-R, R-B and E-R are denoted by hnAR(k), hnRB(k) and hnER(k), and dnAR(k),
dnRB(k) and dnER(k), respectively.
Each multipath component is assumed to be suffer from statistically independent
Rayleigh fading and CA and propagation delay of it are assumed to remain constant
over a frame (message transmission is organized by frame-by-frame) but to vary in-
dependently and continuously from one frame to the next. Such temporal variations
in terms of CA and delay are highly correlated [58, 76]. Thus, hnij follows a zero-
mean complex Gaussian distribution. In general, for a specific multipath channel,
their channel gains might not be identical variance (e.g., in the case of an exponential
power delay profile). We assume that channel gains have an identical variance, i.e.,
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hnij ∼ CN (0, σ2hij ) [12, 14, 31].
To explore the temporal variation of channel gain, we need to investigate the
auto-correlation function of channel gain. According to the Jakes’ model [30], channel
variation is affected by the Doppler frequency. Similar to that of previous studies [14,
31, 50], identical maximum Doppler frequency is considered in multipath channels.
Then, the auto-correlation function of hnij (k) under arbitrary time lag ts, can be
given by
ϕij(ks) = E{hnij(k)h∗nij (k + ks)} = σ2hijJ0(2πfijks), (5.2)
where J0(·) is the zeroth order Bessel function of the first kind. fij is maximum
normalized Doppler frequency. Based on the above results, we employ the auto-
regressive model of order 1 (AR-1) [14, 31, 50] to describe time-varying channel gain,
and then we have
hnij (k) = αijhnij (k − 1) +
√
1− α2ijunij (k), (5.3)
where AR coefficient αij is denoted by ϕij(1)/σ
2
hij
; unij ∼ CN (0, σ2hij ) is independent
of hnij (k − 1).
Moreover, the propagation delay of multipath components can be modeled by a
Poisson process [77]. Therefore, delay interval (DI) between two delays of adjacent
multipath components at time k is an exponentially distributed random variable,
which is defined by
τkij (k) , dkij(k)− dk−1ij(k), k = 1, 2, ..., Nij − 1. (5.4)
One can easily see that τkij (k) is also time-varying. Similar to the simple assump-
tion for hnij , we also assume that τkij (k) is statistically independent and identically
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distributed random variable [14].
We adopt correlated Gaussian random variables to characterize the correlation
between τkij (k−1) and τkij (k). This is reasonable due to the fact that an exponentially
distributed random variable can be decomposed as the sum of the squares of two
independent Gaussian distributed random variables. Hence, τkij(k − 1) and τkij (k)
can be decomposed, respectively, as
τkij (k − 1) = τ(1)kij (k − 1) + τ
(2)
kij
(k − 1), (5.5)
τkij(k) = τ
(1)
kij
(k) + τ
(2)
kij
(k), (5.6)
where τ
(1)
kij
, τ
(2)
kij
are mutually independent Gaussian distributed random variables with
zero mean and variance σ2
τij
. Similar to previous work [14], we also use AR-1 to model
the temporal processes of τ
(1)
kij
and τ
(2)
kij
, and then we have
τ
(ℓ)
kij
(k) = βijτ
(ℓ)
kij
(k − 1) +
√
(1− β2ij)σ2τiju(ℓ)kij(k), ℓ = 1, 2, (5.7)
where AR coefficient βij has the similar definition with αij given in (5.3); u
(ℓ)
ij,k(k) ∼
N(0, 1) is independent of τ
(ℓ)
ij,k(k − 1).
5.1.3 Communication Model
Frame-by-frame transmission is considered in this paper. A transmission frame
consists of deterministic pilot symbols used for channel estimation and stochastic data
symbols. When A transmits a signal s(k) to B at time k with the aid of R, the total
transmission is accomplished by the following two phases. For Phase I, A transmits
the signal s(k) at the average transmitted power P to R and the signal received at R
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yB(k) = ξ
√
P
NAR∑
nAR=1
NRB∑
nRB=1
hnAR(k)hnRB(k)s(k − dnAR(k)− dnRB(k))
+ ξ
√
P
NRB∑
nRB=1
hnRB(k)wR(k − dnRB(k)) + wB(k). (5.9)
is
yR(k) =
√
P
NAR∑
nAR=1
hnAR(k)s(k − dnAR(k)) + wR(k), (5.8)
where wR ∼ CN (0, σ2w) is AWGN.
For Phase II, yR(k) is then multiplied by an amplification factor ξ and retrans-
mitted to B at power P . The amplification factor commonly used in the literature is
ξ =
√
P
Pσ2
hAR
+σ2w
.
Since the transmitting time and operation delay are much less than the operation
delay (see Section 5.1.1), so we can neglect the transmitting time and operation
delay. Therefore, the AWGN at B is denoted by wB ∼ CN (0, σ2w), and then the
corresponding received signal at B is given in (5.9),
From (5.9), we know that the channel impulse response from the transmitter to
the receiver via the relay is a cascade of the multipath channels in two hops, i.e., it
is a cascaded multipath channel. According to [76], the double (cascaded) Rayleigh
fading model can be used to characterize such cascaded multipath components. The
CA of each cascaded multipath component is the product of CAs of two multipath
components in two hops over this cascaded path, and the corresponding delay is the
sum of delays of two multipath components in two hops over this cascaded path. The
CA of the nthAB cascaded multipath components for A-R-B is denoted by
hnAB(k) = hnAR(k)hnRB(k), (5.10)
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where nAB = 1, 2, ..., NARNRB , nAR = 1, 2, ..., NAR and nRB = 1, 2, ..., NRB.
Then, the corresponding DI is denoted by
τkAB(k) = τkAR(k) + τkRB(k), (5.11)
where kAB = 1, 2, ..., NARNRB−1, kAR = 1, 2, ..., NAR−1 and kRB = 1, 2, ..., NRB−1.
When E transmits signals to B, it has the same the transmission process.
Using methods in [78–82], B can estimate cascaded multipath channel parame-
ters from the received signal in (5.9) In addition, channel and delay estimation are
corrupted by estimation error (additive noise), and such estimation error is much less
than the temporal variations of channel and delay [14]. Therefore, both CA and delay
of channels can be utilized to differentiate between the legitimate transmitter A and
illegitimate transmitter E.
5.2 Proposed E2E Authentication Scheme
The basic principle for the proposed E2E scheme is that the channels are location-
specific, which has been widely adopted to complement and improve traditional se-
curity approaches [12, 14, 31, 51]. Most importantly, this is demonstrated by the
well-known Jakes model [30], that is, the spatial separation of one to two wavelengths
results in independent fading channels. It is difficult (if not impossible) for an attacker
to generate or accurately model the channel being used by the transmitter-receiver
pair. In other words, the channels between different geographic locations decorre-
late rapidly in space due to path loss and channel fading [30, 31]. As a result, the
channel of A-R-B is independent of that of E-R-B. Meanwhile, the channel for the
identical transmitter-receiver pair is highly corrected over time. Hence, CA and DI
of multipath channels can be jointly exploited to authenticate transmitters.
The main procedures of the proposed E2E scheme are illustrated in Fig. 5.2,
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Figure 5.2: The main procedures of the proposed E2E authentication scheme.
(a) First phase transmission.
(b) Second phase transmission.
Figure 5.3: Transmissions of authentication and jamming signals.
where a typical challenge-response procedure is first conducted to initiate the au-
thentication process. The transmissions of authentication and jamming signals is
then implemented between entities involved in communication. Finally, B carries out
a verification procedure to verify whether the current frame is from A or not.
5.2.1 Challenge-response Procedure
In the available authentication schemes developed for wireless systems with di-
rect link between an unknown transmitter X (i.e., X = {A,E}) and the receiver B
[12, 14, 31, 51], the transmitter can directly send authentication signals to the re-
ceiver B anytime without pursing the synchronization with the receiver in advance.
For the dual-hop wireless system with an untrusted relay R concerned in this pa-
per, however, to deal with the possible replay attack from R based on our proposed
scheme, the synchronization between the transmitter and receiver B is required before
the authentication process. For this purpose, the transmitter first sends an authen-
tication request frame (i.e., a challenge), which contains only the synchronization
signal indicating the time that the authentication signal is to be transmitted, such
that the synchronization between the transmitter and B can be achieved in the next
transmission process of authentication and jamming signals.
85
yR(k) =
√
PA
NAR∑
nAR=1
hnAR(k)s(k − dnAR(k))
+
√
PB
NRB∑
nRB=1
hnRB(k)v(k − dnRB(k)) + wR(k). (5.12)
After receiving the authentication request from A, B sends back a response frame
which only includes one symbol to confirm the requested time for synchronization.
5.2.2 Transmissions of Authentication and Jamming Signals
As illustrated in Fig. 5.3, the transmissions of authentication and jamming signals
at time t includes two phases. In the first phase transmission (Fig. 5.3(a)), transmitter
X sends a frame including the signal to be authenticated to R. This signal consists
of both pilot and data symbols. Concurrently, receiver B sends a jamming frame
with the jamming signal to R in a cooperative manner, making the untrusted R to
receive a composite signal of authentication and jamming signals. Here, the jamming
signals can be generated by utilizing a pseudo-random noise generator such as the
one in [83] and is then stored at B. Without loss of generality, we use v(k) and PB
to denote jamming signal and the average symbol power transmitted by B. When
the transmitter is A (i.e., X = A), (5.8) becomes (5.12). As shown in Fig. 5.3(b),
the composite signal given in (5.12) is then multiplied by an amplification factor at
R and retransmitted to B in the second phase transmission [58].
5.2.3 Verification Procedure
5.2.3.1 CA/DI Estimation
After receiving the composite signal of jamming and authentication signals, B first
removes the jamming signal through the well-developed self-interference cancellation
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of CA/DI estimation/quantization and decision.
techniques [84, 85], and thus extracts the desired signal (i.e., consisting of pilot and
data symbols) from the unknown transmitter X (when X = A, the received signal at
B has the same expression as (5.9)). Since the generated jamming signal is known
to B, it can be eliminated up to a certain extent through efficient techniques of
interference cancellation [84, 85]. To present the optimal authentication performance
of the proposed scheme, we follow the ideal assumption here that perfect cancellation
of self-interference is achievable [86]. As shown in Fig. 5.4, the estimation of CA/DI
are first performed. Based on the estimation results of CA/DI, quantization is to
qualify the temporal variations of CA/DI. Finally, B decides whether the current
frame is from A or not under a simple binary hypothesis test.
Note that CA and DI of the cascaded channel can be estimated by using the
deterministic pilot symbols, but only a noisy version of cascaded channel is available
at B due to the presence of AWGN. The estimation error caused by such AWGN
is random and independent of the channel, and can be modeled as AWGN random
variable with zero mean.
CA Estimation: Let hˆnAB(k) (resp. hˆEB,nEB(k)) denote the estimation of hnAB(k)
(resp. hEB,nEB(k)) at time k, and then each of them can be modeled as a sum of its
real value and a complex Gaussian noise (i.e., estimation error) wh(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2w).
Then, we have
hˆXB,lXB(k) , hXB,lXB(k) + wh(k)
= hXR,lXR(k)hnRB(k) + wh(k), X = {A,E}. (5.13)
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where σ2w is defined as σ
2
w = Pw/P with Pw representing the average noise power at
the receiver, respectively [12].
DI Estimation: Actually, the DI of each adjacent paths pair in a cascaded
channel can be considered to be the superposition of DIs of each adjacent multipath
components pair in two hops over that paths pair. This is because the delays of
multipath channels are spatially uncorrelated, and the processing time at each entity
is sufficiently small and thus can be neglected [2].
Let τˆ
(1)
kAR
(k) and τˆ
(2)
kAR
(k) represent the estimations of τ
(1)
kAR
(k) and τ
(2)
kAR
(k), respec-
tively. Similar to the estimation of CA, each of them can also be considered as a
sum of its real value and an AWGN (estimation error) wτ(k), they can be written,
respectively, as
τˆ
(ℓ)
kAR
(k) , τ(ℓ)kAR(k) + w
(ℓ)
τ
(k), ℓ = 1, 2. (5.14)
where w
(ℓ)
τ (k) ∼ N (0, σ2w/2). One can easily see that τˆ(ℓ)kAR(k) ∼ N (0, σ2τAR+σ2w/2).
Let τˆkAR(k) denote the estimation of τkAR(k), and then we have
τˆkAR(k) = (τˆ
(1)
kAR
(k))2 + (τˆ
(2)
kAR
(k))2. (5.15)
It can be seen from (5.15) that τˆkAR(k) also follows exponential distribution with
parameter λ = 1
2σ2
τAR
+σ2w
. By using the similar derivation, we can see that both
τˆkRB(k) and τˆkER(k) are also exponentially distributed random variables with param-
eters λ = 1
2σ2
τRB
+σ2w
and λ = 1
2σ2
τER
+σ2w
, respectively. The total DI of the kthXB cascaded
multipath component can be given by
τkXB(k) = τˆkXR(k) + τˆkRB(k). (5.16)
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5.2.3.2 CA/DI Quantization
CA Quantization: To quantify the temporal variation of CA, we use a CA
quantizer which compares the square of absolute value of the CA difference between
the current and previous CA estimations of the same path at adjacent time with
a specified CA threshold. In particular, when the difference is not larger than the
specified CA threshold, the output of CA quantizer is 0; otherwise, the output of that
is 1. We use Qh and Oh,n to denote CA quantizer and the n
th output of CA quantizer,
respectively, where n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and N = min{NXRNRB, NARNRB}. Then, CA
quantization can be formulated as
Oh,n,Qh[|hˆnAB(k)− hˆnAB(k − 1)|2]
=


0, |hˆnAB(k)− hˆnAB(k − 1)|2 ≤ δh,
1, otherwise.
(5.17)
where δh represents the specified CA threshold.
DI Quantization: To quantify the temporal variation of DI, a DI quantizer is
employed by comparing the absolute value of the DI difference between the current
and previous DI estimations of the same paths pair at adjacent time with a specified
time threshold. Specifically, when the difference is not larger than the specified time
threshold, the output of DI quantizer is 0; otherwise, the output of that is 1. Let Qτ
and Oτ,k denote DI quantizer and the k
th output of the quantizer, respectively, where
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}. Then, DI quantization can be formulated as
Oτ,k,Qτ[|τˆkXB(k)− τˆkAB(k − 1)|]
=


0, |τˆkXB(k)− τˆkAB(k − 1)| ≤ δτ,
1, otherwise.
(5.18)
where δτ is the specified time threshold.
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Let Dh and Dτ represent the sum of Oh,n and Oτ,k, respectively, and then we
have Dh ,
∑N
n=1Oh,n and Dτ ,
∑N−1
k=1 Oτ,k. It is easy to see that we have Dh ∈
{0, 1, ..., N} and Dτ ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}.
5.2.3.3 Decision Criterion
Based on the above quantization results, we establish a decision criterion under
a binary hypothesis test to differentiate between the legitimate frame from A and
illegitimate frame from E. For simplicity, we denote by D the sum of Dh and Dτ,
and then the binary hypothesis test can be formulated as
H0 : D , Dh +Dτ ≤ Z
H1 : D , Dh +Dτ > Z,
(5.19)
where Z represents a non-negative integer decision threshold between 0 and 2N − 1.
Under H0, the newly received frame at B is still from legitimate transmitter A. Under
H1, it is from adversary E.
5.2.4 Security Analysis
The location-specific characteristics of CA and DI make the proposed scheme im-
mune to impersonate attacks from external attackers. Meanwhile, jamming signals
can confuse the untrusted R and thus avoid simple replay attack from the possible
internal attacker R. Furthermore, due to the lack of pilots and any pre-known refer-
ence symbols in the authentication request signal, the attackers cannot probe channel
in advance. All of these properties ensure the security of this scheme, as analyzed in
the followings.
(1) A simple attacker E: When attacker E is located near a legitimate transmitter
A, it will fail to impersonate A by injecting aggressive signals due to that both CA
and DI are location-specific.
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(2) A smart attacker E: Due to the presence of artificial jamming, it becomes
much more difficult (if not impossible) to estimate multipath channels A-E and E-R
via the authentication signal transmitted by A, even the attacker E is close to R.
Therefore, the smart attacker E will fail to construct multipath channel A-R and
E-R and impersonate A by modifying its signal.
(3) Untrusted relay R: Although the untrusted relay R or other active attacker
E are able to replay signals based on what they obtained, the proposed scheme can
be immune to such attacks. This is mainly due to the fact that artificial jamming is
randomly generated by B and different artificial jamming sequences that are unknown
to attackers are generated at different time sots.
Remark 5 In fact, the system model in terms of network topology is symmetrical.
By setting work pattern of entities (e.g., Alice has the ability to estimate, qualify
channel and make a decision), E2E mutual authentication between Alice and Bob can
be achieved.
5.3 Modeling of FA and MD Probabilities
In this section, we first derive some basic results regarding the probabilities that
the outputs of two quantizers under two hypotheses are 1, respectively, and then use
the results to derive the expressions for PF and PM . For simplicity, we use P
H
ı to
denote the probability that Qı outputs 1 on H, for ı = {h, τ} and  = {0, 1}.
5.3.1 FA Probability
Lemma 11 For a given CA threshold δh and hnRB(k − 1), PH0h can be evaluated as
PH0h = exp
(
− δh
2(1− α)σ2hAR|hnRB(k − 1)|2 + 2σ2w
)
. (5.20)
where α = αARαRB ≤ 1 is the equivalent auto-correlation coefficient of hnAB .
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Proof 16 Under H0, the newly received signal at B is regarded to be from A, i.e.,
X = A. Based on (5.3), we first explore the CA evolution of cascaded multipath
channels with the time-series model [87]. Time-series model of hnAB can be written
as
hnAB(k) = αhnAB(k − 1) +
√
1− α2hnRB(k − 1)unAR(k). (5.21)
Let ∆hA,A denote the difference between hˆnAB(k) and hˆnAB(k − 1),
∆hA,A , hˆnAB(k)− hˆnAB(k − 1)
= (α− 1)hnAR(k − 1)hnRB(k − 1) +
√
1− α2hnRB(k − 1)unAR(k)
+ wh(k)− wh(k − 1). (5.22)
Since the hnAR(k − 1)hnRB(k − 1) term in (5.22) follows complex double Gaus-
sian distribution under Rayleigh fading model [88], it is difficult (if not possible)
to analytically model ∆hA,A. It is interesting to see that for a given hnRB(k − 1),
hnAR(k − 1)hnRB(k − 1) follows complex Gaussian distribution. In the concerned
network scenario, B extracts hnRB(k − 1) by exploiting the blind channel estimation
techniques widely adapted in previous studies [89]. Therefore, for a given hnRB(k−1),
∆hA,A is also a complex Gaussian distributed random variable with zero mean and
variance σ2∆hA,A = 2(1−α)σ2hAR |hnRB(k−1)|2+2σ2w. We can see that |∆hA,A|2 follows
exponential distribution and its cumulative distribution function (CDF) is given by
F|∆hA,A|2(x) = 1− exp
(
− x
2(1− α)σ2hAR|hnRB(k − 1)|2 + 2σ2w
)
.
(5.23)
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According to (5.17), PH0h can be determined as
PH0h , Pr(Qh[|hˆnAB(k)− hˆnAB(k − 1)|2] = 1 | H0) = 1−Pr(|∆hA,A|2 ≤ δh). (5.24)
Substituting (5.23) into (5.24), we can obtain (5.20).
Lemma 12 For a given time threshold δτ, P
H0
τ
can be evaluated as
PH0
τ
=
1
1− η2AR
η2RB
(
η2AR
η2RB
exp
(
− δτ
ηAR
)
− exp
(
− δτ
ηRB
))
,
(5.25)
where
ηAR =
√
4σ4
τAR
(1− β2AR) + 4σ2τARσ2w + σ4w, (5.26a)
ηRB =
√
4σ4
τRB
(1− β2RB) + 4σ2τRBσ2w + σ4w. (5.26b)
Proof 17 See Appendix B.1 for the proof.
We use PF to represent the probability of FA. Then, we can establish the following
main results on PF based on Lemma 11 and 12.
Theorem V.1 PF of the proposed scheme in a dual-hop wireless network with an
untrusted relay is given in (5.27).
Proof 18 Based on (5.19) and the law of total probability formula, PF can be given
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PF =


N−1∑
z=Z+1
z∑
z1=0
(
N
z1
)
(PH0h )
z1(1− PH0h )N−z1
(
N−1
z−z1
)
(PH0
τ
)z−z1(1− PH0
τ
)N−1−z+z1
+
2N−1∑
z=N
N−1∑
z1=z−N
(
N
z−z1
)
(PH0h )
z−z1(1− PH0h )N−z+z1
(
N−1
z1
)
(PH0
τ
)z1(1− PH0
τ
)N−1−z1 ,
Z ∈ [0, N − 1],
(5.27a)
2N−1∑
z=Z+1
N−1∑
z1=z−N
(
N
z−z1
)
(PH0h )
z−z1(1− PH0h )N−z+z1
(
N−1
z1
)
(PH0
τ
)z1(1− PH0
τ
)N−1−z1 ,
Z ∈ [N, 2N − 1].
(5.27b)
by
PF = Pr(D > Z|H0)
= Pr(D = Z + 1, Z + 2, · · · , 2N − 1|H0)
=
2N−1∑
z=Z+1
Pr(D = z) =
N−1∑
z=Z+1
Pr(D = z) +
2N−1∑
z=N
Pr(D = z). (5.28)
Therefore, PF can be derived based on the following two cases: When Z ∈ [0, N −
1], substituting (4.25a) into (5.28), PF can be given in (5.27a); when Z ∈ [N, 2N−1],
substituting (4.25b) into (5.28), we can obtain (5.27b).
Corollary 3 In a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay, PF of the pro-
posed scheme utilizing the location-specific of CA separately to discriminate transmit-
ters, can be given by
PF = Pr(D > Z|H0) =
N∑
z=Z+1
Pr(D = z) =
N∑
z=Z+1
(
N
z
)
(PH0h )
z(1− PH0h )N−z. (5.29)
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5.3.2 MD Probability
Under H1, the current transmitter is regarded as E, i.e., X = E. The following
lemmas are dedicated to regarding the probability denoted by PH1ı , ı = {h, τ}.
Lemma 13 For a given CA threshold δh and hnRB(k − 1), PH1h can be evaluated as
PH1h = exp
(
− δh
σ2∆hE,A
)
, (5.30)
where σ2∆hE,A = (α
2
RBσ
2
hER
+ σ2hAR)|hnRB(k − 1)|2 + (1− α2RB)σ2hERσ2hRB + 2σ2w.
Proof 19 See Appendix B.2 for the proof.
Lemma 14 For a given time threshold δτ, P
H1
τ
can be evaluated as
PH1
τ
=
1(
1− η2EA
η2RB
) (η2EA
η2RB
e
− δτ
ηEA − e− δτηRB
)
, (5.31)
where ηEA = σ
2
τER
+ σ2
τAR
+ σ2w.
Proof 20 See Appendix B.3 for the proof.
We use PM to represent the probability of missed detection. Then, we can establish
the following main results on PM based on Lemma 13 and 14.
Theorem V.2 PM of the proposed scheme in a dual-hop wireless network with an
untrusted relay is given in (5.32).
Proof 21 Based on (5.19), PM is expressed as
PM = Pr(D ≤ Z|H1) =
Z∑
z=0
Pr(D = z|H1) =
N−1∑
z=0
Pr(D = z) +
Z∑
z=N
Pr(D = z).
(5.33)
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PM =


Z∑
z=0
z∑
z1=0
(
N
z1
)
(PH1h )
z1(1− PH1h )N−z1
(
N−1
z−z1
)
(PH1
τ
)z−z1(1− PH1
τ
)N−1−z+z1 ,
Z ∈ [0, N − 1], (5.32a)
N−1∑
z=0
z∑
z1=0
(
N
z1
)
(PH1h )
z1(1− PH1h )N−z1
(
N−1
z−z1
)
(PH1
τ
)z−z1(1− PH1
τ
)N−1−z+z1
+
Z−1∑
z=N
N−1∑
z1=z−N
(
N
z−z1
)
(PH1h )
z−z1(1− PH1h )N−z+z1
(
N−1
z1
)
(PH1
τ
)z1(1− PH1
τ
)N−1−z1 ,
Z ∈ [N, 2N − 1].
(5.32b)
Under H1, PM can be derived based on the following two cases: When Z ∈ [0, N − 1],
using PH1h and P
H1
τ
to replace PH0h and P
H0
τ
in (4.25a), respectively, and we substitute
the new resulting into (5.33). Then, PM can be given by (5.32a); when Z ∈ [N, 2N −
1], following a similar process, PM can be given by (5.32b).
Corollary 4 In a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay, PM of the pro-
posed scheme utilizing the location-specific of CA separately to discriminate transmit-
ters, can be given by
PM = Pr(D ≤ Z|H1) =
N∑
z=0
Pr(D = z) =
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(PH1h )
z(1− PH1h )N−1−z. (5.34)
5.4 Numerical Results
5.4.1 System Parameters and Simulation Settings
We list in Table 5.1 the main system parameters that determine the authentication
performance in terms of PF and PM . We use γ¯ to denote the average signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) per hop and use κh to denote the ratio of average CA gains for A-R and
E-R. Since σ2w = Pw/P , the variance of noise σ
2
w in the equation of γ¯ is inversely
proportional to the average transmit power P for a given Pw. In our simulation, we
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Table 5.1: Main system parameters affecting performance
Parameter Description
γ¯AR =
σ2hAR
σ2w
The average SNR of the first hop
γ¯RB =
σ2hRB
σ2w
The average SNR of the second hop
κh =
σ2hER
σ2
hAR
The ratio of averaged channel gains for A-R and E-R
αAR, αRB Channel correlation coefficients
βAR, βRB Delay interval correlation coefficients
δh, δτ, Z CA threshold, time threshold, decision threshold
set σ2hAR = σ
2
hRB
= σ2
τAR
= σ2
τRB
= 1, and then adjust the parameters σ2hER and σ
2
τER
to achieve a specified κh.
Table 5.2: Three fading scenarios
Channel status fAR = fRB = f
Case I Slow-fading .001
Case II Fast-fading .10
Case III Faster-fading .15
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
PF
h = 0 dB, Z = 3
h = 1,  = 2
 CA-DI Theroy
 CA Theroy
 Simulation
P MPM
Figure 5.5: The authentication performance (PF , PM) for the proposed scheme based
on CA-DI or CA vs. average SNR per hop (γ¯AR = γ¯RB = γ¯) under
slow-fading channels.
To validate the theoretical modeling, a dedicated simulator in MATLAB is de-
veloped, which is now available at [90]. The time-varying channels are generated by
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Figure 5.6: Effect of average SNR per hop (γ¯AR = γ¯RB = γ¯) on the authentication
performance (PF , PM) vs. decision threshold Z under slow-fading chan-
nels.
using the method introduced in [91]. The temporal correlation of the time-varying
channels is a function of the normalized Doppler frequency that is affected by the
mobility, carrier frequency and symbol duration. Based on the normalized Doppler
frequencies illustrated in Table 5.2, we consider three fading channels associated with
correlation coefficients (i.e., αAR, αRB, α = αARαRB , βAR, βRB). Different normalized
Doppler frequency values in Table 5.2 correspond to different moving velocity of en-
tity under a given carrier frequency and symbol duration[58]. For a fair comparison,
the number of multipath components for A-R and E-R are both fixed to be 3, while
that of multipath components for R-B is fixed to be 2. For Monte-Carlo experiments,
105 independent trails are conducted to obtain the average results.
5.4.2 Model Validation
To verify the theoretical results, we summarize in Fig. 5.5 both the simulation
and theoretical models of PF and PM for the proposed scheme based on CA-DI or
CA, where the slow-fading channels and settings of (Z = 3, κh = 0 dB, δh = 1,
δτ = 2) are assumed. Fig. 5.5 shows clearly that the simulation results agree well
with the theoretical ones, confirming that our theoretical models can be used to nicely
characterize PF and PM . It can also be seen from Fig. 5.5 that as the average SNR per
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Figure 5.7: PF and PM vs. (δh, δτ) when Z = 1, γ¯ = 10 dB and κh = 0 dB under
slow-fading channels.
hop γ¯ increases, PF for the proposed scheme based on CA-DI or CA declines rapidly,
whereas the corresponding PM increases slowly. This reveals that a trade-off exists
between reliability and security in terms of PF and PM . Moreover, Fig. 5.5 shows that
when γ¯ is small, the proposed scheme jointly using CA and DI outperforms that only
using CA in terms of PM . While for PF , the result is reverse. This is due to the fact
that by jointly utilizing the location-specific properties of cascaded channel in terms
of CA and DI, the proposed scheme can effectively detect impersonation attacks at
the cost of incurring more false alarm events. In addition, it can be observed from
Fig. 5.5 that when γ¯ is large (e.g., γ¯ ≥ 12dB), PF for the proposed scheme based
on either CA-DI or CA approaches 0, but the scheme jointly using CA and DI still
outperforms that only using CA in terms of PM .
5.4.3 Control of FA and MD Probabilities
To demonstrate that the proposed scheme enables the authentication performance
to be flexibly controlled in a large region, we now explore how PF and PM vary
with parameters Z, δh and δτ. Fig. 5.6 shows the effect of γ¯ on the PF and PM
versus Z, where the slow-fading channels and settings of (κh = 0 dB, δh = 1.5,
δτ = 2) are assumed. As observed from Fig. 5.6, PM increases rapidly as Z increases,
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while PF declines quickly with Z. It is interesting to notice that PF is extremely
sensitive to the variations of Z. For example, when Z ≥ 4, PF approaches 0 under
γ¯ = {8 dB, 10 dB, 12 dB}. We can see from Fig. 5.6 that for a fixed Z, PF decreases
with γ¯ while PM increases with γ¯. Noticed that for an authentication system, both
PF and PM are in general required to be below 0.1 [12, 14, 31, 32]. Therefore, for the
specified PF and PM constraints (e.g., PF , PM ≤ 0.1), we can increase the transmit
power and find an optimal setting of Z. For example, we can set Z = 1 and γ¯ ≥ 10
dB to ensure PF , PM ≤ 0.1. It is notable, however, that for general wireless networks
applications, the total power of system is limited to a certain level due to the energy
constraint and interference requirement among simultaneous transmissions, so it is of
great significance to find the optimal setting of parameters δh and δτ to satisfy the
specified PF and PM constraints under a given Z and power limitation.
Fig. 5.7 shows how PF and PM vary with parameters (δh, δτ) under the slow-fading
channels and settings of (Z = 1, γ¯= 10 dB, κh = 0 dB). As shown in Fig. 5.7(a) (resp.
Fig. 5.7(b)) that for a specified constraint pf of PF (resp. a specified constraint
pm of PM), we can accordingly set a specified constraint plane intersecting the z-
axis orthogonally at the point (2, 2, pf ) (resp. at the point (2, 2, pm)), and then
can determine a set of (δh, δτ)-pairs corresponding to the surface below the defined
constraint plane. By finding the intersection of these two sets of (δh, δτ)-pairs, we can
obtain the region of (δh, δτ)-pairs to achieve the pf and pm constraints in terms of PF
and PM . For example, when δh, δτ ∈ [0.2, 3], one can observe from Fig. 5.7 that the
requirement of PF ≤ 0.1 can be achieved in the regions of (δh ∈ [1, 3], δτ ∈ [1.2, 3]),
while the requirement of PM ≤ 0.1 is achieved in the regions of (δh ∈ [0.2, 2.5],
δτ ∈ [0.2, 2.2]). Thus, the constraints of (PF , PM ≤ 0.1) under the considered network
scenario are achieved when δh ∈ [1, 2.5] and δτ ∈ [1.2, 2.2].
Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7 indicate that the proposed scheme is flexible and general, since
PF and PM can be flexibly controlled by a proper setting of the decision threshold
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Z, CA threshold δh, and time threshold δτ. Also, a trade-off between reliability and
security can be controlled by an appropriate setting of δh and δτ.
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Figure 5.8: Effect of κh on the authentication performance (PF , PM) vs. average SNR
per hop (γ¯AR = γ¯RB = γ¯) under slow-fading channels.
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Figure 5.9: Effect of channel status on the authentication performance (PF , PM) vs.
average SNR per hop (γ¯AR = γ¯RB = γ¯).
5.4.4 Authentication Efficiency Analysis
To illustrate the authentication efficiency of the proposed scheme, we further ex-
plore the authentication performance of the scheme under diverse network scenarios
with different positions of E and different channels. Fig. 5.8 shows the effect of the
position of E on the authentication performance (PF , PM) versus γ¯ under slow-fading
channels, where Z=1, δh = 1.5, δτ = 2, and κh varies from -5 dB to 5 dB. We can
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see from Fig. 5.8 that PF is not affected by the variations of κh. This is because
the position of E is not related to FA events. It is noticed that for a fixed γ¯, PM
increases as κh reduces. We also find that when γ¯ is small, the setting of κh has a
little impact on PM ; when γ¯ is large, the setting of κh has a significant impact on PM ,
especially when κh=-5 dB, PM approaches 0.1. It implies that a “smart” intruder E
would seek a position where it could have a higher probability to impersonate attacks
successfully. Fortunately, the proposed scheme can adjust dynamically the optimal
setting of (Z, δh, δτ) to resist against such attacks. This indicates that for various
positions of E, the proposed scheme is efficient to discriminate transmitters through
the proper settings of (Z, δh, δτ).
Finally, Fig. 5.9 demonstrates the effect of channel status on the authentication
performance (PF , PM) versus γ¯, given that Z = 1, κh = 0 dB, δh = 1.5, δτ = 2. Notice
also that in terms of PF , the proposed scheme under case I (slow-fading channels)
outperforms that under the others (case II and case III), and the scheme under case
III (faster-fading channels) leads to the highest PF . This indicates that excessive
false alarm events will happen when channels are faster-fading (e.g. in a higher
mobile scenario). However, in terms of PM , the proposed scheme under faster-fading
channels has the lowest PM , which means that the faster-fading channels are beneficial
for effectively detecting impersonation attacks. Fig. 5.9 confirms that under various
channels, the proposed scheme is also efficient in identifying transmitters by a proper
setting of the decision threshold Z, CA threshold δh, time threshold δτ and average
SNR per hop γ¯.
5.5 Summary
This chapter represents an attempt to explore the E2E authentication issue for
dual-hop wireless networks by exploiting the intrinsic properties of cascaded multi-
path channels. We showed that the proposed E2E authentication scheme is not only
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efficient in discrimination between the legitimate and illegitimate transmitters, but
also resistant to impersonating attacks with the attacker near the legitimate trans-
mitter and resistant to replay attacks with aggressive signals from the untrusted relay.
We also proved that the proposed scheme is flexible and general in the sense that this
scheme makes it possible for us to flexibly control FA and MD probabilities in a large
region through the proper settings of parameters. This is an important property
for wireless networks to support various applications with different authentication
performance requirements. In addition, it is expected that the proposed authentica-
tion scheme and related theoretical models will be useful for providing a guideline to
devise the coping strategies under various attacks, as well as for understanding the
fundamental E2E authentication performance of multi-hop wireless networks.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied physical layer authentication for wireless communica-
tions, where intrinsic and unique features of physical layer are explored to authen-
ticate transmitters for wireless communications. We first explored channel-based
authentication solution for massive MIMO systems with hardware impairments, and
then investigated authentication solution which exploits two physical layer features
in terms of location-specific wireless channels and transmitter-specific hardware im-
pairments. Finally, we examined E2E channel-based authentication issue in dual-hop
wireless networks with untrusted relays.
For channel-based authentication solution with the consideration of hardware im-
pairments, we studied in Chapter III an uplink massive MIMO system consisting of
three different entities with hardware impairments. We proposed a channel-based
authentication scheme for massive MIMO systems with different levels of hardware
impairments. We theoretically analyzed FA and SD probabilities. Our results show
that the performance is clearly deteriorated by hardware impairments, with a non-
trivial impact from the choice of antenna patterns. Notice that multiple hardware
impairments (such as I/Q imbalance and phase noise) can be effectively utilized to
authenticate transmitters, which is demonstrated in the literature. While in this
chapter their effects have been taken into account by using κ-parameters.
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For authentication solution exploiting two physical layer features in terms of
location-specific wireless channels and transmitter-specific hardware impairments, we
investigated in Chapter IV a MIMO system consisting of three different entities: Al-
ice and Eve with Nt antennas and Bob with Nr antennas. We proposed a physical
layer authentication scheme jointly utilizing channel gains and phase noise in hetero-
geneous MIMO systems. We also determined the variances of estimation errors in
terms of channel gains and phase noise, and then derived closed-form expressions for
false alarm and missed detection probabilities with the consideration of quantization
errors. We further demonstrated that the proposed scheme enables flexible perfor-
mance control by adjusting thresholds (for channel gain, phase noise, and decision,
respectively). This indicates that the proposed scheme has the capability of satis-
fying different performance requirements for future emerging heterogeneous MIMO
systems.
In Chapter V, we addressed E2E authentication issue in dual-hop wireless net-
works with untrusted relays. We first proposed an E2E channel-based authentication
scheme. We showed that the proposed scheme is efficient in discrimination between
the legitimate and illegitimate transmitters as well as resistant to impersonating at-
tacks with the attacker near the legitimate transmitter and resistant to replay attacks
with aggressive signals from the untrusted relay. We also proved that the proposed
scheme is flexible and general in the sense that this scheme makes it possible for us to
flexibly control FA and MD probabilities in a large region through the proper settings
of parameters. This is an important characteristic for wireless networks to support
various applications with different authentication performance requirements. In ad-
dition, it is expected that the proposed authentication scheme and related theoretical
models will be useful for providing a guideline to devise the coping strategies under
various attacks, as well as for understanding the fundamental E2E authentication
performance of multi-hop wireless networks.
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It is notable that, this thesis considers relatively simple physical layer features
such as wireless channels (e.g., channel gains and multi-path delay) and hardware
impairments (e.g., phase noise). In practice, however, considering multi-dimensional
features (e.g., channel impulse response, channel frequency response, I/Q imbalance,
carrier frequency offset, and phase noise) for authentication is an interesting research
topic for our future work to further explore how these physical layer features can be
jointly used to improve the security of wireless communications.
In addition, for 5G and IoT networks with low latency requirements, a more
effective design for fast authentication approach should be investigated. This issue
offers us an interesting future research direction and diverse further research in our
future work.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs in Chapter IV
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Based on Lemma 1, we can explore the distribution of x on the two hypotheses.
Using (3.1) on H0, we have
x = hA[k]− hA[k − 1] + ǫA[k − 1]− ǫA[k]
= (α− 1)hA[k − 1] +
√
1− α2eA[k] + ǫA[k − 1]− ǫA[k]. (A.1)
From (A.1), we can see that x is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random vector. This
is because hA, eA and ǫA are mutually independent zero-mean complex Gaussian
random vectors. Using (3.6), C0 is determined as (3.10a). Similarly, x on H1 can be
written as
x = hE [k]− hA[k − 1] + ǫA[k − 1]− ǫE[k]. (A.2)
Since hE , hA, ǫA and ǫE are mutually independent zero-mean complex Gaussian
random vectors, x on H1 is also a zero-mean complex Gaussian random vector. Based
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on (3.6), C1 is determined as (3.10b). We can see from (3.10a) and (3.10b) that C1
can be decomposed as
C1 = C0 +K. (A.3)
where K is given by (3.11).
For simplicity, we define the inverse of Ci as Qi, that is, Qi , C
−1
i . Note that
both RA and RE are nonsingular due to the assumption of complex Gaussian random
channel vector, so C0, C1, and K are also nonsingular. Therefore, we can always find
Q0 and Q1. Let ∆Q = Q0 − Q1, which can be further written by applying matrix
inversion lemma stated in [55, Lemma 2.3] as ∆Q = C−10 KC
−1
1 .
Using (3.10a) and (3.10b), the probability density functions (PDFs) of x on the
two hypotheses can be written as
f(x|Hi) = 1
πMdet(Ci)
exp(−xHQ−1i x), i = 0, 1. (A.4)
We use L0(x) to denote a LRT and δ0 a threshold. Neyman–Pearson Criterion in
[59] leads us to a LRT, which can be written as
L0(x) , f(x|H1)
f(x|H0) =
det(C0)
det(C1)
exp(−xHQ1x)
exp(−xHQ0x)
H1
≷
H0
δ0. (A.5)
Taking logarithms and retaining only data-dependent terms, we can obtain logarith-
mic LRT as (3.8).
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A.2 Proof of Theorem III.1
Proof of Theorem III.1 for IID: Combining (3.9) and (3.10), we can obtain
the LRT in (3.8) under IID case as
L(x) , λD
λC0(λC0 + λD)
M∑
m=1
|xm|2
H1
≷
H0
δ. (A.6)
Based on the above results, we now derive expressions for PF and PD under IID
case. Since xm/
√
λC0 on H0 is independent zero mean complex Gaussian variable
with variance 1,
∑M
m=1 |xm/
√
λC0|2 is a chi-square random variable with 2M degrees
of freedom, that is,
∑M
m=1 |xm/
√
λC0|2 ∼ χ22M . PF under IID can be given by
PF = Pr(L(x) > δ|H0) = Pr

 M∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣ xm√λC0
∣∣∣∣∣
2
>
(
λC0
λD
+ 1
)
δ|H0

 . (A.7)
Substituting the right-tail probability function of chi-square random variable into
(A.7) yields (3.19a) under IID case.
Following the same steps, we can obtain PD under IID case as
PD = Pr(L(x) > δ|H1). (A.8)
Substituting the right-tail probability function of chi-square random variable into
(A.8) yields (3.20a) under IID case.
Proof of Theorem III.1 for IUV: Combining (3.9) and (3.17), we can obtain
the LRT in (3.8) under IUV case as
L(x) , λDm
λC0,m(λC0,m + λDm)
M∑
m=1
|xm|2
H1
≷
H0
δ. (A.9)
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Under H0, the characteristic function of |xm|2 is
M|xm|2|H0(jω) = E{exp(jω|xm|2)|H0}
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
(jω − 1
λC0,m
)|xm|2
)
πλC0,m
dxm
= (1− jωλC0,m)−1. (A.10)
Let am =
λK,m
λC0,m+λK,m
. Thus, we can obtain the characteristic function of L(x) on H0
as
ML(x)|H0(jω) =
M∏
m=1
(1− jωam)−1. (A.11)
We use a partial fraction expansion [92] of (A.11) to obtain
ML(x)|H0(jω) =
M∑
m=1
bm(1− jωam)−1, (A.12)
where
bm =
M∏
i=1
i 6=m
am
am − ai . (A.13)
As observed from (A.12), the characteristic function of L(x) is a weighted su-
perposition of exponentially distributed characteristic functions. After taking inverse
Fourier transform for (A.12), we can see that the PDF of L(x) is also a weighted
superposition of exponentially distributed PDFs [59], that is,
f(L(x)|H0) =
M∑
m=1
bm
am
exp
(
− L
am
)
. (A.14)
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PF under IUV case can be obtained by integrating the following formula as
PF = Pr(L(x) > δ|H0) =
∫ ∞
δ
f(L(x)|H0)dL(x). (A.15)
Then, substituting (A.12) into (A.15) yields (3.19b) under IUV.
Similarly, the characteristic function of L(x) on H1 is
ML(x)|H1(jω) =
M∏
m=1
(1− jωcm)−1. (A.16)
Following the same steps, we can obtain PD (3.20b) by integrating the following
formula (A.17).
PD = Pr(L(x) > δ|H1) =
∫ ∞
δ
f(L(x)|H1)dL(x). (A.17)
A.3 Proof of Theorem III.2
When |ρA| = |ρE | = 1, the characteristic functions of L(x) on the two hypotheses
can be obtained by using (3.25) as
ML(x)|H0(jω) =
(
1− jω λ21
λ01 + λ21
)−1
, (A.18)
ML(x)|H1(jω) =
(
1− jωλ21
λ01
)−1
. (A.19)
L(x) is an exponentially distributed random variable. Similar to the derivations of
(3.19b) and (3.20b), we can obtain (3.28a) and (3.29a).
When 0 < |ρt| < 1, using the modal matrix uHDw in (3.27), we transform from xw
to xwu = [xwu,1 · · ·xwu,M ]T , which is denoted by xwu = uHDwxw = uHDwwHx. Now, we
explore the covariance matrices of xwu on the two hypotheses. On H0, its covariance
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matrix is given by
Cov(xwu|H0) = E{xwuxHwu|H0} = E{uHDwxwxHwuDw|H0}
= uHDwIuDw = I. (A.20)
Similarly, on H1 the covariance matrix of xwu is given by
Cov(xwu|H1) = E{xwuxHwu|H1} = uHDwR1wuDw
= uHDwuDw[ΛDw + I]u
H
DwuDw = ΛDw + I. (A.21)
We define a diagonal matrix Qwu as
Qwu , diag
[
λDw,1
λDw,1 + 1
, ...,
λDw,M
λDw,M + 1
]
= diag [λwu,1, ..., λwu,M ] . (A.22)
Applying some derivations similar to that in [59, Chapter 3], under spatially cor-
related channel component case, the LRT L(x) in (3.8) becomes
L(x) , L(xwu) = xHwuQwuxwu =
M∑
m=1
λDw,m
λDw,m + 1
|xwu,m|2 =
M∑
m=1
λwu,m|xwu,m|2
H1
≷
H0
δ.
(A.23)
Note that x is linearly transformed to xwu, and the effect of this transform is to
decorrelate x. Therefore, xwu,m also follows zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution
and thus |xwu,m|2 follows exponential distribution. When 0 < |ρt| < 1, PF and PD
can be evaluated as
PF = Pr(L(x) > δ|H0) =
∫ ∞
δ
f(L(x)|H0)dL(x) ,
∫ ∞
δ
f(L(xwu)|H0)dL(xwu),
(A.24)
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PD = Pr(L(x) > δ|H1) =
∫ ∞
δ
f(L(x)|H1)dL(x) ,
∫ ∞
δ
f(L(xwu)|H1)dL(xwu).
(A.25)
Following a similar method as that of in Section 3.3.1, we can obtain PF and PD
as (3.28b) and (3.29b) for 0 < |ρA|, |ρE| < 1.
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APPENDIX B
Proofs in Chapter V
B.1 Proof of Lemma 12
Let ∆τAR = τˆkAR(t) − τˆkAR(t − 1), ∆τRB = τˆkRB(t) − τˆkRB(t − 1), and ∆τA,A =
τˆkAB(t)− τˆkAB(t− 1), then ∆τAB can be further written as
∆τA,A , τˆkAB(t)− τˆkAB(t− 1)
= τˆkAR(t)− τˆkAR(t− 1) + τˆkRB(t)− τˆkRB(t− 1)
= ∆τAR +∆τRB . (B.1)
To explore the distribution of random variable ∆τA,A, we first examine that of
∆τAR. Based on (5.15), ∆τAR can be written as (B.2). Combining (5.7), (5.14) and
(5.15), the random variable C1 defined in (B.2) can be given by
C1 = τˆ
(1)
kAR
(t)− τˆ(1)kAR(t− 1)
= (βAR − 1)τ(1)kAR(t− 1) +
√
(1− β2AR)σ2τARu
(1)
kAR
(t) + w(1)
τ
(t)− w(1)
τ
(t− 1). (B.3)
Since τ
(1)
kAR
, u
(1)
kAR
and w
(1)
τ are independent Gaussian distributed random variables
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∆τAR = (τˆ
(1)
kAR
(t))2 + (τˆ
(2)
kAR
(t))2 − (τˆ(1)kAR(t− 1))2 − (τˆ
(2)
kAR
(t− 1))2
= (τˆ
(1)
kAR
(t)− τˆ(1)kAR(t− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C1
(τˆ
(1)
kAR
(t) + τˆ
(1)
kAR
(t− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2
+ (τˆ
(2)
kAR
(t)− τˆ(2)kAR(t− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3
(τˆ
(2)
kAR
(t) + τˆ
(2)
kAR
(t− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4
. (B.2)
with zero mean, C1 is also a Gaussian distributed random variable with zero mean
and variance σ2C1 = 2σ
2
τAR
(1 − βAR) + σ2w. After a similar derivation, C2, C3, C4
are also Gaussian distributed random variables with zero means and variances with
σ2C3 = σ
2
C1
, and σ2C2 = σ
2
C4
= 2σ2
τAR
(1 + βAR) + σ
2
w. It is easy to see that C1, C2, C3
and C4 are independent of each other, and we have
∆τAR = C1C2 + C3C4
=
√
4σ4
τAR
(1− β2AR) + 4σ2τARσ2w + σ4w︸ ︷︷ ︸
ηAR
(
C1
σC1
C2
σC2
+
C3
σC3
C4
σC4
)
(B.4)
According to [93, Eq.(2.2.13)], ∆τAR follows the Laplace distribution, that is,
∆τAR ∼ Laplace(0, ηAR). After a similar derivation, we know that ∆τRB also follows
the Laplace distribution ∆τRB ∼ Laplace(0, ηRB).
According to [93, Eq.(2.3.23)], the probability density function (PDF) of the sum
of two independent Laplace distributed random variables ∆τAR and ∆τRB can be
determined as
f∆τAB(x) = 1 +
1
1− η2AR
η2RB
(
η2AR
η2RB
e
− x
ηAR − e− xηRB
)
. (B.5)
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After a simple mathematical derivation, we can obtain the CDF of |∆τA,A| as
F|∆τA,A|(x) = 1 +
1
1− ( ηAR
ηRB
)2
(
η2AR
η2RB
e
− x
ηAR − e− xηRB
)
. (B.6)
Using (5.18), the probability that Qτ outputs 1 under H0, can be determined as
Pτ,H0 , Pr(Qτ[|τˆkAB(t)− τˆkAB(t− 1)|] = 1 | H0)
= Pr(|∆τA,A| > δτ) = 1−Pr(|∆τA,A| ≤ δτ). (B.7)
Substituting (B.6) into (B.7), we can obtain (5.25).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 13
Let ∆hE,A represent the difference between hˆnEB(t) and hˆnAB(t − 1). Combining
(5.13) and (5.21), ∆hE,A is determined as
∆hE,A , hˆnEB(t)− hˆnAB(t− 1)
= αRBhnER(t)hnRB(t− 1)
+ hnER(t)
√
1− α2RBunRB(t− 1)− hnAR(t− 1)hnRB(t− 1) + wh(t)− wh(t− 1).
(B.8)
For a given hnRB(t − 1), ∆hE,A is a complex Gaussian distributed random vari-
able with zero mean and variance σ2∆hE,A = (α
2
RBσ
2
hER
+ σ2hAR)|hnRB(t − 1)|2 + (1 −
α2RB)σ
2
hER
σ2hRB + 2σ
2
w. Then, the CDF of |∆hE,A|2 can be derived as
F|∆hE,A|2(x) = 1− exp
(
− x
σ2∆hE,A
)
. (B.9)
121
Based on (5.17), Ph,H1 can be evaluated as
Ph,H1 , Pr(Qh[|hˆnEB(t)− hˆnAB(t− 1)|2] = 1 | H1) = 1−Pr(|∆hE,A|2 ≤ δh).
(B.10)
Substituting (B.9) into (B.10), we can get (5.30).
B.3 Proof of Lemma 14
Let ∆τE,A = τˆkEB(t) − τˆkAB(t − 1) and ∆τEA = τˆkER(t) − τˆkAR(t − 1), and then
we have ∆τE,A , ∆τEA +∆τRB . Based on (5.15), ∆τEA can be further written as
∆τEA , (τˆ
(1)
kER
(t))2 + (τˆ
(2)
kER
(t))2 − (τˆ(1)kAR(t− 1))2 − (τˆ
(2)
kAR
(t− 1))2. (B.11)
We know that ∆τEA is also a Laplace distributed random variable [93], that is,
∆τEA ∼ Laplace(0, ηEA). (B.12)
Similarly, we can derive the PDF of the sum of two independent Laplace dis-
tributed random variables ∆τEA and ∆τRB by applying [93, Eq.(2.3.23)]. Thus, we
have
f∆τE,A(x) = 1 +
1(
1− η2EA
η2
RB
) (η2EA
η2RB
e
− x
ηEA − e− xηRB
)
. (B.13)
The CDF of |∆τE,A| can be given by
F|∆τE,A|(x) = 1 +
1(
1− η2EA
η2RB
) (η2EA
η2RB
e
− x
ηEA − e− xηRB
)
. (B.14)
According to (5.18), the probability that Qτ outputs 1 under H1 can be given by
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Pτ,H1 , Pr(Qτ[|τˆkEB(t)− τˆkAB(t− 1)|] = 1 | H1) = 1−Pr(|∆τEB| ≤ δτ). (B.15)
Finally, substituting (B.14) into (B.15) yields (5.31).
123

BIBLIOGRAPHY
125

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Y. Zhang, Y. Shen, X. Jiang, and S. Kasahara, “Mode selection and spectrum
partition for D2D inband communications: A physical layer security perspec-
tive,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 623–638, Jan. 2019.
[2] D. Shan, K. Zeng, W. Xiang, P. Richardson, and Y. Dong, “PHY-CRAM: Phys-
ical layer challenge-response authentication mechanism for wireless networks,”
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 1817–1827, Sep. 2013.
[3] T. O. Olwal, K. Djouani, and A. M. Kurien, “A survey of resource management
toward 5G radio access networks,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 18, no. 3,
pp. 1656–1686, thirdquarter 2016.
[4] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, Nov. 1976.
[5] S. V. Kartalopoulos, “A primer on cryptography in communications,” IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 146–151, Apr. 2006.
[6] P. Christof, J. Pelzl, and B. Preneel, Understanding Cryptography: A Textbook
for Students and Practitioners. Springer, 2010.
[7] U. Raza, P. Kulkarni, and M. Sooriyabandara, “Low power wide area networks:
An overview,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 855–873, Jan.
2017.
[8] J. G. Andrews, S. Buzzi, W. Choi, S. V. Hanly, A. Lozano, A. C. K. Soong, and
J. C. Zhang, “What will 5G be?” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 32, no. 6,
pp. 1065–1082, Jun. 2014.
[9] X. B. Wang, P. Hao, and L. Hanzo, “Physical-layer authentication for wire-
less security enhancement: current challenges and future developments,” IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 152–158, Jun. 2016.
[10] N. Yang, L. Wang, G. Geraci, M. Elkashlan, J. Yuan, and M. D. Renzo, “Safe-
guarding 5G wireless communication networks using physical layer security,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 20–27, Apr. 2015.
[11] P. Gope and B. Sikdar, “Lightweight and privacy-preserving two-factor authen-
tication scheme for IoT devices,” IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 6, no. 1, pp.
580–589, Feb. 2019.
127
[12] L. Xiao, L. J. Greenstein, N. B. Mandayam, and W. Trappe, “Channel-based
spoofing detection in frequency-selective Rayleigh channels,” IEEE Trans. Wire-
less Commun., vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 5948–5956, Dec. 2009.
[13] X. W. L. Xiao and Z. Han, “PHY-layer authentication with multiple landmarks
with reduced overhead,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no. 3, pp.
1676–1687, Dec. 2017.
[14] J. Z. Liu and X. B. Wang, “Physical layer authentication enhancement using
two-dimensional channel quantization,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15,
no. 6, pp. 4171–4182, Feb. 2016.
[15] V. Brik, S. Banerjee, M. Gruteser, and S. Oh, “Paradis: Wireless device iden-
tification with radiometric signatures,” in Proc. ACM MobiCom, Sep. 2008, pp.
116–127.
[16] W. Wang, Z. Sun, S. Piao, B. Zhu, and K. Ren, “Wireless physical-layer identifi-
cation: Modeling and validation,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 11,
no. 9, pp. 2091–2106, Sep. 2016.
[17] E. Bjo¨rnson, J. Hoydis, M. Kountouris, and M. Debbah, “Massive MIMO systems
with non-ideal hardware: Energy efficiency, estimation, and capacity limits,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 11, pp. 7112–7139, Nov. 2014.
[18] E. Bjo¨rnson, M. Matthaiou, and M. Debbah, “Massive MIMO with non-ideal
arbitrary arrays: Hardware scaling laws and circuit-aware design,” IEEE Tran.
Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 8, pp. 4353–4368, Aug. 2015.
[19] C. Studer, M. Wenk, and A. Burg, “MIMO transmission with residual transmit-
RF impairments,” in Proc. ITG/IEEE Workshop on Smart Antennas (WSA),
2010.
[20] T. Schenk, RF Imperfections in High-Rate Wireless Systems: Impact and Digital
Compensation. Springer, 2008.
[21] M. Wenk, “MIMO-OFDM-Testbed: Challenges, implementations, and measure-
ment results, ser. series in microelectronics,” Ph.D. dissertation, ETH Zurich,
Hartung-Gorre, 2010.
[22] and R. A. Pacheco, , and D. Hatzinakos, “Joint estimation of channel response,
frequency offset, and phase noise in OFDM,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 3542–3554, Sep. 2006.
[23] H. Mehrpouyan, A. A. Nasir, S. D. Blostein, T. Eriksson, G. K. Karagiannidis,
and T. Svensson, “Joint estimation of channel and oscillator phase noise in MIMO
systems,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 60, no. 9, pp. 4790–4807, Sep. 2012.
128
[24] O. H. Salim, A. A. Nasir, H. Mehrpouyan, W. Xiang, S. Durrani, and R. A.
Kennedy, “Channel, phase noise, and frequency offset in OFDM systems: Joint
estimation, data detection, and hybrid Crame´r-Rao lower bound,” IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 62, no. 9, pp. 3311–3325, Sep. 2014.
[25] F. Septier, Y. Delignon, A. Menhaj-Rivenq, and C. Garnier, “Monte Carlo meth-
ods for channel, phase noise, and frequency offset estimation with unknown noise
variances in OFDM systems,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 56, no. 8, pp.
3613–3626, Aug. 2008.
[26] X. He and A. Yener, “End-to-end secure multi-hop communication with un-
trusted relays,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1–11, Jan.
2013.
[27] S. Vatedka, N. Kashyap, and A. Thangaraj, “Secure compute-and-forward in a
bidirectional relay,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 2531–2556, May
2015.
[28] Q. Liu and G. Gong, “Physical layer secure information exchange protocol for
mimo ad hoc networks against passive attacks,” in Proc. 2016 IEEE global com-
munications conference (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2016, pp. 1–6.
[29] P. Zhang and X. Jiang, “Channel-based authentication for dual-hop wireless
networks,” in Proc. 2018 International Conference on Networking and Network
Applications (NaNA), Oct. 2018, pp. 42–46.
[30] W. C. Jakes and D. C. Cox, Microwave mobile communications. Wiley, 1994.
[31] L. Xiao, G. L. J, N. B. Mandayam, and W. Trappe, “Using the physical layer for
wireless authentication in time-variant channels,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Com-
mun., vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 2571–2579, Jul. 2008.
[32] P. Baracca, N. Laurenti, and S. Tomasin, “Physical layer authentication over
MIMO fading wiretap channels,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 11, no. 7,
pp. 2564–2573, Jul. 2012.
[33] J. K. Tugnait and H. Kim, “A channel-based hypothesis testing approach to
enhance user authentication in wireless networks,” in Proc. IEEE COMSNETS,
Jan. 2010, pp. 1–9.
[34] J. K. Tugnait, “Wireless user authentication via comparison of power spectral
densities,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 1791–1802, Sep.
2013.
[35] A. Ferrante, N. Laurenti, C. Masiero, M. Pavon, and S. Tomasin, “On the error
region for channel estimation-based physical layer authentication over Rayleigh
fading,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 941–952, May
2015.
129
[36] K. Zeng, K. Govindan, and P. Mohapatra, “Non-cryptographic authentication
and identification in wireless networks,” IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no. 5,
pp. 56–62, Oct. 2010.
[37] A. C. Polak, S. Dolatshahi, and D. L. Goeckel, “Identifying wireless users via
transmitter imperfections,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 29, no. 7, pp.
1469–1479, Aug. 2011.
[38] A. C. Polak and D. L. Goeckel, “Identification of wireless devices of users who
actively fake their RF fingerprints with artificial data distortion,” IEEE Tran.
Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 11, pp. 5889–5899, Nov. 2015.
[39] P. Hao, X. Wang, and A. Behnad, “Relay authentication by exploiting i/q imbal-
ance in amplify-and-forward system,” in Proc. IEEE Conf. on Global Commun.
(GLOBECOM), Dec. 2014, pp. 613–618.
[40] W. Hou, X. Wang, J. Chouinard, and A. Refaey, “Physical layer authentication
for mobile systems with time-varying carrier frequency offsets,” IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 1658–1667, May 2014.
[41] W. E. Cobb, E. D. Laspe, R. O. Baldwin, M. A. Temple, and Y. C. Kim, “In-
trinsic physical-layer authentication of integrated circuits,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 14–24, Feb. 2011.
[42] T. J. Bihl, K. W. Bauer, and M. A. Temple, “Feature selection for RF finger-
printing with multiple discriminant analysis and using zigbee device emissions,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 11, no. 8, pp. 1862–1874, Aug. 2016.
[43] S. V. Radhakrishnan, A. S. Uluagac, and R. Beyah, “Gtid: A technique for phys-
ical deviceanddevice type fingerprinting,” IEEE Trans. Depend. Sec. Comput.,
vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 519–532, Sep. 2014.
[44] P. L. Yu, J. S. Baras, and B. M. Sadler, “Physical-layer authentication,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 38–51, Feb. 2008.
[45] P. L. Yu and B. M. Sadler, “MIMO authentication via deliberate fingerprinting
at the physical layer,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp.
606–615, Sep. 2011.
[46] G. Verma, P. Yu, and B. M. Sadler, “Physical layer authentication via fingerprint
embedding using software-defined radios,” IEEE Access, vol. 3, pp. 81–88, Jan.
2015.
[47] N. Xie and S. Zhang, “Blind authentication at the physical layer under time-
varying fading channels,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 7, pp. 1465–
1479, Jul. 2018.
[48] N. Xie and C. Chen, “Slope authentication at the physical layer,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 1579–1594, Jun. 2018.
130
[49] J. B. Perazzone, P. L. Yu, B. M. Sadler, and R. S. Blum, “Cryptographic side-
channel signaling and authentication via fingerprint embedding,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 13, no. 9, pp. 2216–2225, Sep. 2018.
[50] C. Komninakis, C. Fragouli, A. H. Sayed, and R. D. Wesel, “Multi-input multi-
output fading channel tracking and equalization using kalman estimation,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 1065–1076, May 2002.
[51] H. Liu, Y. Wang, J. Liu, J. Yang, Y. Chen, and H. V. Poor, “Authenticating
users through fine-grained channel information,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput.,
vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 251–264, Feb. 2018.
[52] E. Bjo¨rnson. Channel hardening makes fading channels behave as determin-
istic. [Online]. Available: https://ma-mimo.ellintech.se/2017/01/25/channel-
hardening-makes-fading-channels-behave-as-deterministic/
[53] S. L. Loyka, “Channel capacity of MIMO architecture using the exponential
correlation matrix,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 5, no. 9, pp. 369–371, Sep. 2001.
[54] E. Bjornson, D. Hammarwall, and B. Ottersten, “Exploiting quantized chan-
nel norm feedback through conditional statistics in arbitrarily correlated MIMO
systems,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 4027–4041, Oct. 2009.
[55] A. Hjørungnes, Complex-valued Matrix Derivatives: With Applications in Signal
Processing and communications. Cambridge University, 2011.
[56] S. M. Kay, Fundamentals of Statistical Signal Processing, Volumne II: Detection
Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1998.
[57] S. Wang, A. Abdi, J. Salo, H. M. El-Sallabi, J. W. Wallace, P. Vainikainen, and
M. A. Jensen, “Time-varying MIMO channels: Parametric statistical modeling
and experimental results,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 1949–
1963, Jul. 2007.
[58] M. R. Avendi and H. H. Nguyen, “Performance of selection combining for dif-
ferential amplify-and-forward relaying over time-varying channels,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 4156–4166, Apr. 2014.
[59] H. L. V. Trees, K. L. Bell, and Z. Tian, Detection, Estimation, and Modulation
Theory, Part I: Detection, Estimation, and Filtering Theory, 2nd ed. Wiley,
2014.
[60] A. Sabharwal, A. Khoshnevis, and E. Knightly, “Opportunistic spectral us-
age: Bounds and a multi-band CSMA/CA protocol,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.,
vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 533–545, Jun. 2007.
[61] D. Tse and P. Viswanath, Fundamentals of wireless communication. Cambridge
university press, 2005.
131
[62] A. Goldsmith, Wireless communications. Cambridge university press, 2005.
[63] A. Pitarokoilis, E. Bjo¨rnson, and E. G. Larsson, “ML detection in phase noise
impaired simo channels with uplink training,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 64,
no. 1, pp. 223–235, Jan. 2016.
[64] A. Pitarokoilis, S. K. Mohammed, and E. G. Larsson, “Uplink performance of
time-reversal MRC in massive MIMO systems subject to phase noise,” IEEE
Tran. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 711–723, Feb. 2015.
[65] O. H. Salim, A. A. Nasir, H. Mehrpouyan, and W. Xiang, “Multi-relay com-
munications in the presence of phase noise and carrier frequency offsets,” IEEE
Tran. on Commun., vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 79–94, Jan. 2017.
[66] Y. Wang and J. Lee, “A simple phase noise suppression scheme for massive
MIMO uplink systems,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 4769–
4780, Jun. 2017.
[67] K. J. Kim, R. A. Iltis, and H. V. Poor, “Frequency offset and channel estimation
in cooperative relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 60, no. 7, pp.
3142–3155, Sep. 2011.
[68] A. A. Nasir, H. Mehrpouyan, R. Schober, and Y. Hua, “Phase noise in MIMO
systems: Bayesian Crame´r-Rao bounds and soft-input estimation,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 10, pp. 2675–2692, May 2013.
[69] C. Zhao, M. Huang, L. Huang, X. Du, and M. Guizani, “A robust authentica-
tion scheme based on physical-layer phase noise fingerprint for emerging wireless
networks,” Computer Networks, vol. 128, no. 9, pp. 164–171, May 2017.
[70] O. Besson and P. Stoica, “On parameter estimation of MIMO flat-fading channels
with frequency offsets,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 602–613,
Mar. 2003.
[71] Z. Wang, P. Babu, and D. P. Palomar, “Effective low-complexity optimization
methods for joint phase noise and channel estimation in OFDM,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 65, no. 12, pp. 3247–3260, Jun. 2017.
[72] K. J. Kim, M. Pun, and R. A. Iltis, “Joint carrier frequency offset and chan-
nel estimation for uplink MIMO-OFDMA systems using parallel Schmidt Rao-
Blackwellized particle filters,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 58, no. 9, pp. 2697–
2708, Sep. 2010.
[73] P. Tichavsky, C. H. Muravchik, and A. Nehorai, “Posterior Crame´r-Rao bounds
for discrete-time nonlinear filtering,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 46, no. 5,
pp. 1386–1396, May 1998.
132
[74] D. Cox and R. Leck, “Distributions of multipath delay spread and average excess
delay for 910-MHz urban mobile radio paths,” IEEE Trans. Antennas Propag.,
vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 206–213, Mar. 1975.
[75] U. M. Maurer, “Authentication theory and hypothesis testing,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 1350–1356, Jul. 2000.
[76] M. Uysal, “Diversity analysis of space-time coding in cascaded Rayleigh fading
channels,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 165–167, Mar. 2006.
[77] Y. Cho, J. Kim, W. Yang, and C. Kang, MIMO-OFDM wireless communications
with MATLAB. John Wiley & Sons, 2010.
[78] T. G. Manickam, R. J. Vaccaro, and D. W. Tufts, “A least-squares algorithm for
multipath time-delay estimation,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 42, no. 11,
pp. 3229–3233, Nov. 1994.
[79] M. C. Vanderveen, A. . V. der Veen, and A. Paulraj, “Estimation of multipath
parameters in wireless communications,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 46,
no. 3, pp. 682–690, Mar. 1998.
[80] F. Ge, D. Shen, Y. Peng, and V. O. K. Li, “Super-resolution time delay estima-
tion in multipath environments,” IEEE Comput. Sci. Eng. Mag., vol. 54, no. 9,
pp. 1977–1986, Sep. 2007.
[81] C. S. Patel and G. L. Stuber, “Channel estimation for amplify and forward relay
based cooperation diversity systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 6,
no. 6, pp. 2348–2356, Jun. 2007.
[82] F. Gao, T. Cui, and A. Nallanathan, “On channel estimation and optimal train-
ing design for amplify and forward relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Com-
mun., vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 1907–1916, May 2008.
[83] C. Wang, H. M. Wang, and X. G. Xia, “Hybrid opportunistic relaying and jam-
ming with power allocation for secure cooperative networks,” IEEE Trans. Wire-
less Commun., vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 589–605, Feb. 2015.
[84] E. Everett, A. Sahai, and A. Sabharwal, “Passive self-interference suppression
for full-duplex infrastructure nodes,” IEEE Tran. Wireless Commun., vol. 13,
no. 2, pp. 680–694, Feb. 2014.
[85] F. Zhu, F. Gao, T. Zhang, K. Sun, and M. Yao, “Physical-layer security for full
duplex communications with self-interference mitigation.” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 329–340, Jan. 2016.
[86] J. B. Kim, J. Lim, and J. M. Cioffi, “Capacity scaling and diversity order for
secure cooperative relaying with untrustworthy relays,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 3866–3876, Jul. 2015.
133
[87] M. R. Avendi and H. H. Nguyen, “Performance of differential amplify-and-
forward relaying in multinode wireless communications,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Tech-
nol., vol. 62, no. 8, pp. 3603–3613, Oct. 2013.
[88] N. O’Donoughue and J. M. F. Moura, “On the product of independent complex
gaussians,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 1050–1063, Mar.
2012.
[89] C. Wang, H. M. Wang, and X. G. Xia, “Hybrid opportunistic relaying and jam-
ming with power allocation for secure cooperative networks,” IEEE Trans. Wire-
less Commun., vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 589–605, Feb. 2015.
[90] Baesd-MATLAB simulator for E2E PLA for dual-hop wireless networks. [Online].
Available: https://github.com/zpcanson/E2E-PLA-simulation.
[91] Y. Zheng and C. Xiao, “Simulation models with correct statistical properties
for Rayleigh fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on communications, vol. 51,
no. 6, pp. 920–928, Jun. 2003.
[92] K. R. Rao and N. Ahmed, “Recursive techniques for obtaining the partial fraction
expansion of a rational function,” IEEE Trans. Educ., vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 152–154,
Jun. 1968.
[93] S. Kotz, T. Kozubowski, and K. Podgorski, The Laplace distribution and general-
izations: a revisit with applications to communications, economics, engineering,
and finance. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
134
Publications
Jounal Articles
[1] Pinchang Zhang, Jinxiao Zhu, Yin Chen, and Xiaohong Jiang. “End-to-end phys-
ical layer authentication for dual-hop wireless networks,” IEEE Access, vol.7, pp.
38322-38336, Mar. 2019.
[2] Pinchang Zhang, Tarik Taleb, Xiaohong Jiang, and Bin Wu. “Physical layer
authentication for massive MIMO systems with hardware impairments,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 349-360, Mar. 2020.
[3] Pinchang Zhang, Jun Liu, Yulong Shen, Hewu Li, and Xiaohong Jiang.
“Lightweight tag-based PHY-layer authentication for IoT devices in smart cities,”
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2019.2958079.
[4] Pinchang Zhang, Yulong Shen, Xiaohong Jiang, and Bin Wu. “Physical layer
authentication jointly utilizing channel and phase noise in MIMO systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Communications, DOI: 10.1109/TCOMM.2020.2967393.
[5] Pinchang Zhang, Jun Liu, Yulong Shen, and Xiaohong Jiang. “Exploiting channel
gain and phase noise for PHY-layer authentication in massive MIMO systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. (Response to major
revision, submitted)
Conference Papers
[6] Pinchang Zhang and Xiaohong Jiang. Channel-based authentication for dual-
hop wireless networks. 2018 International Conference on Networking and Network
Applications (NaNA), Xi’an, China, Oct., pp. 42-46, 2018
135
